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INTRODUCTION 
Charter schools are the fastest growing form of public education in 
the United States.  Since the first charter school opened in 
Minneapolis, St. Paul in 1992, the charter school movement has grown 
to include forty-two states and the District of Columbia,1 with over 
6,004 charter schools educating 2.2 million students.2  While school 
choice measures, such as vouchers and education tax credits, are often 
hotly debated,3 the dramatic growth of charter schools over the past 
twenty-six years reflects a bipartisan acceptance of charter schools as 
 
 1. CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICA’S CHARTER 
SCHOOLS 2014 5 (Ted Rebarber & Alison C. Zgainer eds., 2014) [hereinafter 
ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICA’S CHARTER SCHOOLS]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. See James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School 
Choice, 111 YALE L.J. 2043, 2063–85 (2002); Aaron Jay Saiger, School Choice and 
States’ Duty to Support “Public” Schools, 48 B.C. L. REV. 909, 910–11 (2007).  School 
choice programs permit parents to choose among a variety of non-tuition options if 
they are unsatisfied with the performance of their district public school. See Brian P. 
Marron, The Final Reform: A Centrist Vision of School Choice, 8 GEO. J. ON 
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 321, 327 (2001). 
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a viable and successful method for education reform in the United 
States.4 
Notwithstanding this bipartisan support, there remains a powerful 
barrier to charter school formation and success: inequitable funding 
between charter schools and traditional public school.5  The Center 
for Education Reform reports that charter schools receive on average 
roughly thirty percent less funding than local public schools.6  In a 
2005 report titled Inequity’s Next Frontier, the Thomas B. Fordham 
Foundation found that charter schools in twenty-six out of twenty-
seven communities received between $1,000 to $5,000 less per pupil 
than district-run public schools.7  This funding disparity continued 
following the economic recession of 2007–2008, reaching roughly 
$4,352 per pupil in 2011.8  Coalitions of charter schools in several 
states have successfully sued local school districts under state 
education finance laws for inequitable distribution of federal and 
state funds.9  Recent commentators also suggest that charter schools 
may have a claim under state constitutional “education clauses”10 and 
the federal Equal Protection Clause.11 
 
 4. During National Charter School Week, Presidents of the United States, from 
Presidents Clinton to Trump, have annually recognized the key role that charter 
schools play in empowering parents and systemically reforming education. See Press 
Release, President George W. Bush, National Charter Schools Week 2008 (May 2, 
2008), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/05/20080502-
10.html [https://perma.cc/ADE7-XVD6]; Proclamation 7297, President William J. 
Clinton, National Charter Schools Week 2000 (Apr. 28, 2000), 
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/proclamation-7297-national-charter-
schools-week-2000 [https://perma.cc/3E62-4VAD].  In addition, through the 2008 
presidential campaign, President Obama declared his support for expanding funding 
for charter schools. See David J. Hoff, Obama Elected 44th President, EDUC. WK. 
(Nov. 4, 2008), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2008/11/05/12obama.h28.html 
[https://perma.cc/49DC-NQLX]. 
 5. See generally CHESTER E. FINN, JR. ET AL., THOMAS B. FORDHAM INST., 
CHARTER SCHOOL FUNDING: INEQUITY’S NEXT FRONTIER 1 (2005) [hereinafter 
INEQUITY’S NEXT FRONTIER]; MEAGAN BATDORFF ET AL., UNIV. OF ARK. DEP’T OF 
EDUC. REFORM, CHARTER SCHOOL FUNDING: INEQUITY EXPANDS (2014) [hereinafter 
INEQUITY EXPANDS]; MEAGAN BATDORFF ET AL., BALL STATE UNIV., CHARTER 
SCHOOL FUNDING: INEQUITY PERSISTS (2010) [hereinafter INEQUITY PERSISTS]. 
 6. See ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICA’S CHARTER SCHOOLS, supra note 1, at 9. 
 7. See INEQUITY’S NEXT FRONTIER, supra note 5, at VII. 
 8. See INEQUITY EXPANDS, supra note 5, at 8. 
 9. See, e.g., Balt. City Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs v. City Neighbors Charter Sch., 929 
A.2d 113 (Md. 2007); Sugar Creek Charter Sch., Inc. v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of 
Educ., 655 S.E.2d 850 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008); Foreman v. Chester-Upland Sch. Dist., 
941 A.2d 108 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2008), cert. granted, 951 A.2d 264 (Pa. 2008). 
 10. See Saiger, supra note 3, at 914; see, e.g., Robert J. Martin, Charting the Court 
Challenges to Charter Schools, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 43, 45 (2004) (examining 
challenges to charter schools on state and federal constitutional grounds); Andrew 
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There are myriad sources of the charter school funding gap.  
Charter schools tend to have greater non-educational expenses 
related to transportation, facilities, and other administrative costs.12  
Using ambiguously worded state statutes, school districts have 
increasingly withheld funds to charter schools allowing for 
“administrative fees” or used their bargaining power to reduce funds 
and services to charter schools.13  Unlike public schools, charter 
schools are often unable to access “top up” funds provided by local 
tax revenue and are barred from accessing public debt markets.14  
Additionally, in most states, charter schools cannot organize as their 
own Local Education Agency (LEA) and must therefore rely on the 
local school board, which could be hostile to the charter school, to 
appropriate funds.15  Despite these challenges, charter schools 
flourished with the support of philanthropic foundations, corporate 
funding, and community support.  However, donations, grants, and 
corporate funding are an unreliable source of revenue, and several 
charter school managers cite this reliance as a source of concern for 
charter school future operation and growth.16  Lack of adequate 
funding and fiscal mismanagement are the primary reasons charter 
schools close — not failure to improve student achievement.17 
 
Broy, Comment, Charter Schools and Education Reform: How State Constitutional 
Challenges Will Alter Charter School Legislation, 79 N.C. L. REV. 493, 534 (2001). 
 11. See Greg Rubio, Note, Surviving Rodriguez: The Viability of Federal Equal 
Protection Claims by Underfunded Charter Schools, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1643 
(2008); Mark D. Evans, Comment, An End to Federal Funding of For-Profit Charter 
Schools?, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 617 (2008). See also Learning Cmty. Charter Sch. v. 
Bd. of Educ. of Jersey City, No. A-5551-14T3, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2276 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017) (state education clause challenge); J.D. ex rel. 
Scipio-Derrick v. Davy, 2 A.3d. 387 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (equal 
protection challenge). 
 12. See CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, SOLVING THE CHARTER SCHOOL FUNDING GAP 
(Shaka L.A. Mitchell & Jeanne Allen eds., 2005), https://www.edreform.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/CER-CSFundingGap2005.pdf [https://perma.cc/V8SL-
9YKE] [hereinafter CHARTER SCHOOL FUNDING GAP]. 
 13. Id. 
 14. INEQUITY’S NEXT FRONTIER, supra note 5, at vii, 3. 
 15. See CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, WHY CHARTER SCHOOLS SHOULD BE THEIR 
OWN INDEPENDENT LEA (2008), https://www.edreform.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/CER_LEA_primer.pdf [https://perma.cc/UR3Q-884J] 
[hereinafter CHARTER SCHOOL LEA]. 
 16. See INEQUITY’S NEXT FRONTIER, supra note 5, at 2; INEQUITY EXPANDS, supra 
note 5, at 32. 
 17. ALISON CONSOLETTI, CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, THE STATE OF CHARTER 
SCHOOLS 8–12 (2011), https://www.edreform.com/wp-
content/uploads/2011/12/StateOfCharterSchools_CER_Dec2011-Web-1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P82T-B27E]. 
76 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVI 
This Article examines the current public sources of charter school 
finance, explores the systemic reasons for the charter school funding 
gap, and proposes initiatives for narrowing this gap.18  Part I gives a 
brief overview of the charter school movement and describes the 
charter school funding gap and its sources.  Part II examines the 
process of charter school formation and maintains that authorizers 
and charter school models are determinative effects of funding 
disparities.  Part III discusses the limited federal, state, and local 
education finance programs that charter schools are eligible for, and 
Part IV explores initiatives to narrow the charter school public 
funding gap. 
I. CHARTER SCHOOL MOVEMENT AND THE FUNDING 
GAP 
Charter schools are a fairly recent phenomenon, gaining popularity 
in the early nineties and steadily gaining momentum in the public 
domain through the early 2000s and, in the present, surviving 
existential threats in the form of legal challenges and hostility from 
local, state, and federal officials. Ever present throughout the history 
of the charter school movement are conversations surrounding 
educational funding for public schooling generally, and, within such 
conversations, a debate as to whether charter schools ought to be 
funded at the same level as traditional public schools. 
A. The History and Legal Challenges to the Charter School 
Movement 
Charter schools are independent, non-sectarian, tuition-free public 
schools that operate pursuant to a limited-duration charter, or 
contract, granted by a statutorily designated sponsoring organization 
(an “authorizer”).19  Charter schools are a form of school choice 
program designed to give parents and students the ability to attend 
publicly funded alternative schools rather than traditional public 
schools.20  A charter is a “performance contract” whereby a school 
receives “regulatory freedom in exchange for increased 
 
 18. This Article will not examine judicial responses to the charter school funding 
gap.  For a discussion of federal litigation of the charter school funding gap, see note 
10.  For a discussion of state litigation over charter schools, see note 9. 
 19. See Ryan & Heise, supra note 3, at 2074; Stephen D. Sugarman & Emlei M. 
Kuboyama, Approving Charter Schools: The Gate-Keeper Function, 53 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 869, 870 (2001). 
 20. See Ryan & Heise, supra note 3, at 2074. 
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accountability.”21  The charter outlines the goals of the school, how 
student performance will be measured, what levels of achievement 
the school will attain, and the length of the charter (typically five 
years).22  If a school succeeds in meeting its stated goals, it may be 
relieved from regulations concerning student recruitment, curriculum, 
budget, and staffing.23  If at the end of the charter period the school 
fails to attract students and to abide by its governing rules, 
regulations, and procedures, violates other provisions of its charter, or 
generally fails to raise achievement among its students, it can be 
closed.24 
The charter school concept appeals to the education reform 
community because it emphasizes choice, accountability, equity, and 
systematic change.25  The relatively limited regulation that charter 
schools are subject to allows the schools to offer a wider array of 
educational programs for students, which can serve as new and 
innovative educational models, especially for at-risk youth.26  Unlike 
traditional public or private schools, charter schools typically admit 
students on a lottery system whereby students who apply are 
admitted at random rather than through the results of a test, 
expanding student access to the schools.27  The ability of an 
authorizer to close a school provides a strict mechanism for 
controlling the quality of the school — deficient schools that 
consistently fail to meet educational standards are removed from the 
educational marketplace.  This quality control mechanism also 
provides a unique market exit strategy within the educational 
marketplace for schools by providing turnover for charter school 
managers and a means by which educational investors may “cash out” 
their investment. 
 
 21. Judith Johnson & Alex Medler, The Conceptual and Practical Development 
of Charter Schools, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 291, 291 (2000). 
 22. Id.; Kevin S. Huffman, Charter Schools, Equal Protection Litigation, and the 
New School Reform Movement, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1290, 1291 (1998). 
 23. Johnson & Medler, supra note 21; see also Huffman, supra note 22. 
 24. Johnson & Medler, supra note 21. 
 25. See id. at 292. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See James Forman, Jr., Do Charter Schools Threaten Public Education? 
Emerging Evidence from Fifteen Years of a Quasi-Market for Schooling, 2007 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 839, 844–67 (2007) (reviewing charter school admissions policies and studies 
examining their effect). 
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The charter school movement developed in the early 1980s, in part 
as a response to a federal government study – A Nation at Risk28 – 
that condemned the state of American public education.  The charter 
school idea was also the product of several intersecting education 
reform principles that emphasized devolution of school control from 
central school districts to local schools and their communities, 
accountability based on measurable outcomes and universal academic 
standards, and the creation of an education marketplace that would 
empower parents through choice and improve schools through 
competition.29 In 1988, former president of the American Federation 
of Teachers, Albert Shanker, first used the phrase “charter school” to 
describe publicly funded alternative independent schools.30  Shanker 
contemplated an arrangement that would “enable any school or any 
group of teachers . . . within a school to develop a proposal for how 
they could better educate youngsters and then give them a ‘charter’ to 
implement the proposal.”31 
The charter school movement is based on four core assumptions 
that emphasize choice, accountability, equity, and systemic change.  
First, that charter schools allow communities to create new public 
schools outside traditional structures. Second, charter schools 
strengthen accountability by giving sponsoring organizations the 
power to withdraw the charter based on measurable performance 
goals.  Third, that charter schools maintain principles of equity and 
excellence in public education by providing tuition-free, non-sectarian 
education available to all students, including those with special needs.  
Finally, that charter schools drive broader change by serving as 
“educational laboratories” for innovative forms of teaching and by 
stimulating traditional schools to make positive changes.32  These 
core assumptions are reflected in state enabling statutes whose 
 
 28. See NAT’L COMM’N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK: THE 
IMPERATIVE FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM (1983), https://www.edreform.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/02/A_Nation_At_Risk_1983.pdf [https://perma.cc/VX4V-
47HL]. 
 29. See CHESTER E. FINN ET AL., CHARTER SCHOOLS IN ACTION 53–74 (2d ed. 
2001); see generally JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND 
AMERICA’S SCHOOLS (1990) (arguing that government delivered education system is 
inefficient); ANDREW J. COULSON, MARKET EDUCATION: THE UNKNOWN HISTORY 
(1999). 
 30. Richard D. Kahlenberg & Halley Potter, Restoring Shanker’s Vision for 
Charter Schools, AM. EDUCATOR, Winter 2014–2015, at 4, 
https://www.aft.org/sites/default/files/kahlenberg.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SRX-G84F]. 
 31. Albert Shanker, Restructuring Our Schools, 65 PEABODY J. EDUC. 88, 97–98 
(1988). 
 32. See Johnson & Medler, supra note 21, at 292. 
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wording determines the vitality of the charter school movement in a 
particular state.33 
The success of the charter school movement can be measured in 
several ways.  First, state courts repeatedly approve of charter schools 
by rejecting challenges brought by teachers unions and local school 
boards, which often have claimed that charter schools are not public 
schools, so their funding violated public funds provisions of state 
constitutions.34  Second, an increasing number of state and national 
studies are concluding that charter schools raise achievement, 
especially for socially and economically disadvantaged students.35  
 
 33. For example, some states, such as Mississippi, place a cap on the number of 
charter schools that can open.  Mississippi only allows fifteen charter schools to be 
formed in the state per year. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-28-7.  Arizona, by contrast, 
allows an unlimited number of charter schools and multiple authorizing agencies. See 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 15-181.  Mississippi currently has one charter school in the state, 
while Arizona has 479. CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, CHARTER SCHOOL LAWS ACROSS 
THE STATES: RANKINGS AND SCORECARDS 3 (16th ed. 2015) [hereinafter CHARTER 
SCHOOL LAWS] (listing factors that make a charter school law strong).  School caps 
have been heavily debated in the literature surrounding charter schools. See Andrew 
J. Rotherham, Smart Charter School Caps: A Third Way on Charter School Growth, 
in HOPES, FEARS, AND REALITY: A BALANCED LOOK AT AMERICAN CHARTER 
SCHOOLS IN 2007 65, 65–66 (Robin Lake ed., 2007), 
https://www.crpe.org/sites/default/files/pub_hfr07_web_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BDD8-BYZU]; LISA M. STULBERG, BEYOND THE BATTLE LINES: 
LESSONS FROM NEW YORK’S CHARTER CAPS FIGHT (2007), 
https://www.crpe.org/sites/default/files/pub_ncsrp_battlelines_jun07_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KY8D-NA4D ]; Todd Ziebarth, Peeling the Lid off State-Imposed 




 34. See State ex rel. Ohio Cong. of Parents & Teachers v. State Bd. of Educ., 857 
N.E.2d 1148 (Ohio 2006); Bd. of Educ. No. 1 in the City and City of Denver v. Booth, 
984 P.2d 639 (Colo. 1999); Council of Orgs. & Others for Educ. about Parochiaid, 
Inc. v. Engler, 566 N.W.2d 208 (Mich. 1997); Wilson v. State Bd. of Educ., 89 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 745 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); Utah Sch. Bds. Ass’n v. Utah State Bd. of Educ., 
17 P.3d 1125 (Utah 2001); In re Grant of Charter Sch. Application of Englewood on 
the Palisades Charter Sch., 753 A.2d 687 (N.J. 2000). 
 35. See, e.g., Zachary Jason, The Battle over Charter Schools, HARV. ED. MAG. 
(Winter 2017), https://www.gse.harvard.edu/news/ed/17/05/battle-over-charter-
schools [https://perma.cc/6CD2-6YEJ] (noting that, “[n]ationwide, low-income 
students, especially black and Hispanic, tend to benefit from charters the most”); 
CAROLINE HOXBY, ACHIEVEMENT IN CHARTER SCHOOLS AND REGULAR PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES: UNDERSTANDING THE DIFFERENCES 1 (2004), 
https://www.innovations.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/4848.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6B3K-BK2D]; KEVIN BOOKER ET AL., ACHIEVEMENT AND 
ATTAINMENT IN CHICAGO CHARTER SCHOOLS (2008), 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR585-1.html [https://perma.cc/5Z2X-
9WRL]; U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., K-8 CHARTER SCHOOLS: CLOSING THE ACHIEVEMENT 
80 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVI 
Third, surveys of public opinion toward charter schools show that a 
majority of people favor charter schools in their communities, 
including surveys conducted in the ten states where charter school 
statutes have not been adopted.36  Additional studies also show an 
increased demand for charter schools among parents.37  Finally, 
recent studies suggest that public school districts that coexist with 
charter schools for extended periods of time are positively influenced 
by the charter schools.38  This indicates an increasing acceptance of 
charter schools as the primary driver of education reform in the 
United States. 
Despite these successes, the charter school movement has been 
criticized on several grounds.  Some commentators argue that 
increasing reliance on charter schools will encourage creeping 
privatization of public education.39  Others argue that charter schools 
 
GAP (2007), http://www.ed.gov/admins/comm/choice/charterk-8/report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RSH6-KH24]. 
 36. See CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, AMERICA’S ATTITUDES TOWARD CHARTER 
SCHOOLS 5 (2008), https://www.edreform.com/wp-
content/uploads/2011/09/CST_poll20081.pdf [https://perma.cc/CET3-S36F] (noting 
that more than 78% of adults support creating charter schools); William G. Howell et 
al., The 2008 Education Next-PEPG Survey of Public Opinion, 8 EDUC. NEXT 1, 3, 26 
(2008), https://www.educationnext.org/the-2008-education-nextpepg-survey-of-
public-opinion/ [https://perma.cc/6Y85-F3DF]. 
 37. BROOKE D. TERRY & MICHAEL ALEXANDER, TEX. PUB. POL’Y FOUND., 
POLICY PERSPECTIVE: CALCULATING THE DEMAND FOR CHARTER SCHOOLS (2008), 
https://files.texaspolicy.com/uploads/2018/08/16092756/2008-08-PP14-charter-bt.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K5U9-JHPA]; Gary Larson, Familiarity Breeds Content: As the 
Charter Movement Grows, So Does Public Approval, NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. 




 38. See, e.g., Christine Campbell & Deborah Warnock, Life After Charters: 
School Districts and Charter School Growth, in HOPES, FEARS, & REALITY: A 
BALANCED LOOK AT AMERICAN CHARTER SCHOOLS IN 2006 11, 17–18 (Robin J. 
Lake & Paul T. Hill eds., 2006) (examining the Dayton School District and finding 
public school improvement with competition from charter schools); George M. 
Holmes et al., Does School Choice Increase School Quality? 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 9683, 2003) (finding that the introduction of charter 
school in North Carolina affected the performance of traditional public schools even 
though students leaving the school district for charter schools were generally high 
performers). 
 39. See, e.g., Barbara Miner, Keeping Public Schools Public: Exploding the 
Privatization Myth, 21 RETHINKING SCHOOLS 14 (2006), 
http://www.rethinkingschools.org/archive/21_01/expl211.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/872C-FEH8] (referring to incremental privatization of public 
functions); see also Richard Mora & Mary Christianakis, Charter Schools, Market 
Capitalism, and Obama’s Neo-Liberal Agenda, 4 J. INQUIRY & ACTION EDUC. 93, 102 
(2011). 
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are undoing the racial integration efforts of the 1970s and 1980s by 
admitting local students from a population that is homogenous.40  
Several states have attempted to address this issue by statutorily 
requiring racial balancing within charters schools.41  Moreover, critics 
argue that because charter schools are under pressure to meet 
exacting state and federal accountability standards, they often 
“counsel out” students with disabilities or special needs, shifting the 
burden of high-cost, hard-to-educate students to public schools.42  
Some have also maintained that charter schools are guilty of “cream-
skimming” — attracting motivated students with involved, supportive 
parents — while leaving public schools to educate the rest.43 
Many of these criticisms are unwarranted.  Several recent surveys 
indicate that the student body at most charter schools mirrors that in 
public schools of the host school district.44  In fact, these studies show 
that because of parents’ frustrations with the public education system, 
charter schools attract even more socio-economically disadvantaged 
and special needs students than surrounding public schools.45  Indeed, 
several state charter school laws direct authorizers to favor granting 
charters to schools that will serve at-risk youth.46  In addition, some 
commentators have shown that charter schools prevent “cream-
skimming” by relying on lottery admissions policies, such that the 
charter schools do not adversely affect neighboring public schools.47  
Lastly, it is of note that the aforementioned criticisms call into 
 
 40. Andre Perry, How Charter Schools Are Prolonging Segregation, BROOKINGS 
INST. (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2017/12/11/how-
charter-schools-are-prolonging-segregation/ [https://perma.cc/566V-A8UE]. 
 41. The constitutionality of such laws has yet to be tested under the Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 
551 U.S. 701 (2007). See also Joseph O. Oluwole & Preston C. Green, III, Charter 
Schools: Racial-Balancing Provisions and Parents Involved, 61 ARK. L. REV. 1, 1 
(2008); Julie F. Mead, Conscious Use of Race as a Voluntary Means to Educational 
Ends in Elementary and Secondary Education: A Legal Argument Derived from 
Recent Judicial Decisions, 8 MICH. J. RACE & L. 63 (2002). 
 42. See generally Clarisse C. Casanova, Note & Comment, Charter Schools: A 
Step in the Right Direction or a Fourth Left Turn for Public Education?, 7 WHITTIER 
J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 231, 232 (2008) (arguing that charter school laws need to be 
reformed to account for special needs students). 
 43. See Forman, supra note 27, at 855–65 (reviewing charter school admissions 
studies). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. F. HOWARD NELSON ET AL., VENTURESOME CAPITAL: STATE CHARTER 
SCHOOL FINANCE SYSTEMS 42 (2000) [hereinafter VENTURESOME CAPITAL] 
(providing examples of states, such as Colorado, Illinois, and Texas, that favor 
formation of charter schools for at-risk youth). 
 47. See Forman, supra note 27, at 865. 
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question whether charter schools are fair when compared with the 
progress of public schools — they do not impugn the success that 
charter schools themselves have had in raising student achievement. 
In many ways, however, charter schools may also be victims of 
their own success.  Charter schools educate roughly two percent of 
student public enrollment, but over twenty-five percent of charter 
school students reside in California, Arizona, Texas, and Washington, 
D.C.48 Moreover, the Center for Education Reform, a charter school 
advocacy body, notes that many states place severe limitations on 
charter school funding and grant host school districts the power to 
withhold funds from charter schools.49  On the federal level, charter 
schools are still subjected to the Every Student Succeeds Act,50 which 
replaced No Child Left Behind, as well as other federal statutes and 
regulations.  Like their public-school counterparts, charter schools 
must show improved educational outcomes through standardized 
testing.  Additionally, charter schools tend to be located in large cities 
and attract a disproportionate number of poor, low-achieving, and 
African American students.  All these practical hurdles stand in 
contrast with the movement’s wide public exposure as an education 
reform model.  This begs the question: What should the public at 
large, and parents with school-aged children in particular, truly expect 
from charter schools?  To expect charter schools to outperform all 
public schools would be “nothing short of a miracle.”51 
B. Money Matters: The Public Charter School Funding Gap 
In the background of the charter school movement’s success are 
two interrelated problems endemic to any systemic educational 
reform: recruiting talented school leaders and teachers to produce 
quality charter schools, and receiving equal funding to traditional 
public schools for operational and facility expenses.52  In the grand 
scheme of educational reform, it is true that teachers, and to some 
 
 48. James E. Ryan, Charter Schools and Public Education, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 
393, 394 (2008) [hereinafter Charter Schools and Public Education]. 
 49. See CHARTER SCHOOL FUNDING GAP, supra note 12, at 2 (stating that South 
Carolina school districts have chosen to withhold funding without challenge). 
 50. Every Student Succeeds Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-95, 129 Stat. 1802.  The 
purpose of ESSA, stated at § 1001 (20 U.S.C. § 6301), is to “provide all children 
significant opportunity to receive a fair, equitable, and high-quality education, and to 
close educational achievement gaps.” 
 51. Charter Schools and Public Education, supra note 48, at 399–400. 
 52. Id. at 400–01. 
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extent administrators, matter.53  Yet the ability for charter schools to 
recruit teachers has led to the problem of teacher quality and 
academic improvement in the classroom, and this has led to the larger 
discussion of performance rates of charter schools in comparison to 
traditional public schools.54 Unlike the overwhelmingly positive 
conversation regarding teachers, charter school finance programs 
have generated a heated debate on the importance of funding in 
education and how best to allocate scarce education-related dollars.55 
Several studies have shown that charter schools receive less public 
education funding than their traditional public counterparts.  Like 
public schools, charter schools receive funding from a mixture of 
federal, state, and local sources based on factors such as enrollment, 
student characteristics, and location.56  In 2003, the American 
Federation of Teachers released a study of charter school finance 
entitled Paying for the Vision, which illustrates funding disparities 
between charter schools and traditional public schools ranging 
between $549 and $1,841 per pupil.57  That same year, the RAND 
Corporation released a report on California charter schools, finding 
that “[c]harter schools have significantly lower participation than 
conventional public schools in categorical aid programs outside the 
block grant” and that “[t]he majority of charter schools are struggling 
 
 53. Id. at 401; see Charles Clotfelter et al., High-Poverty Schools and the 
Distribution of Teachers and Principals, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1345, 1347–48 (2007) 
(discussing recent data on teacher and principal effectiveness on student success). 
 54. See Charter Schools and Public Education, supra note 48, at 402 (stating that 
charter schools may have an advantage in recruiting highly qualified teachers but 
data does not exist to support that this form of recruitment is the most effective way). 
 55. See, e.g., Craig Harris, The Charter-vs.-District School Funding Debate: Who 
Gets More Money?, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (July 12, 2018, 8:24 PM), 
https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/arizona-education/2018/07/12/arizona-
charter-schools-get-more-state-funding-pay-their-teachers-less/686900002/ 
[https://perma.cc/A2E6-2YDY]; Nic Garcia, Charter School Funding Debate Takes 
Center Stage at Senate Education Committee, CHALKBEAT (Feb. 9, 2017), 
https://www.chalkbeat.org/posts/co/2017/02/09/charter-school-funding-debate-takes-
center-stage-at-senate-education-committee/ [https://perma.cc/BNE4-PFPZ]. 
 56. See generally Charter Schools: Who Provides Charter Schools with Their 
Funding? 50-State Comparison, EDUC. COMM’N OF THE STATES (Jan. 2018), 
http://ecs.force.com/mbdata/mbquestNB2C?rep=CS1717 [https://perma.cc/4NG6-
BX68] [hereinafter 50-State Comparison]; Charter Schools: How Is the Funding for a 
Charter School Determined?, EDUC. COMM’N OF THE STATES (Jan. 2018), 
http://ecs.force.com/mbdata/mbquestNB2C?rep=CS1716 [https://perma.cc/XR28-
4ZR7]; VENTURESOME CAPITAL, supra note 46, at 1–7. 
 57. Eric Osberg, Charter School Funding, in CHARTER SCHOOLS AGAINST THE 
ODDS 46 (Paul T. Hill ed., 2006). 
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with acquiring and financing facilities.”58  While these studies suggest 
that the gap between traditional and charter schools may be rather 
small, the methodology of these reports reflects what charter schools 
are expected to receive rather than calculating what charter schools 
actually receive.59 
In a comprehensive study of charter school funding mentioned 
previously, Inequity’s Next Frontier, the Thomas B. Fordham 
Foundation found disparities in actual revenue received by charter 
schools and public schools, between a $245 per pupil (2.4% disparity) 
at its lowest and an estimated $3,453 per pupil (39.5% disparity) at its 
highest.60  The study examined sixteen states and the District of 
Columbia, encompassing 84% of the nation’s charter school students 
during the 2002–2003 school year.61  The greatest gaps were found in 
large urban school districts, where the average gap was $2,256 per 
pupil (23.5%), while the range extended from $766 (9.9%) per pupil in 
Albuquerque, New Mexico to $3,369 (40.4%) per pupil in San Diego, 
California.62  The effect of this funding gap on charter schools is 
substantial: In a charter school with 250 students enrolled and a 
funding gap of $2,256 per pupil, the charter school is shortchanged 
$564,000.  While this data does not directly consider services and 
administrative fees that charter schools pay to local education 
agencies, the substantial funding gaps in most districts suggest that 
even a small change in funding would give charter schools greater 
access to operational funds they otherwise lack.  Reports examining 
the funding disparities in Colorado, New York, Ohio, and Texas 
corroborate Inequity’s Next Frontier findings, and show that funding 
disparities persist.63  Additionally, studies subsequent to Inequity’s 
 
 58. Cathy Krop, Charter School Finances and Facilities, in CHARTER SCHOOL 
OPERATIONS AND PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM CALIFORNIA 113–14 (R. Zimmer 
et al. eds., 2003). 
 59. See Osberg, supra note 57, at 47. 
 60. INEQUITY’S NEXT FRONTIER, supra note 5, at 1. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 2–3. 
 63. See ROBIN JACOBOWITZ & JONATHAN S. GYURKO, CHARTER SCHOOL 
FUNDING IN NEW YORK: PERSPECTIVES ON PARITY WITH TRADITIONAL PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS 2 (2004), 
https://steinhardt.nyu.edu/scmsAdmin/media/users/ggg5/Charter_School_Funding_in
_New_York_-_Jacobowitz_Gyurko_Mar_2004.pdf [https://perma.cc/MFE6-BBJB] 
(noting that funding disparities exist between charter schools and traditional public 
schools at all levels of education and in both general and special education); COLO. 
LEAGUE OF CHARTER SCHOOLS, SHORTCHANGED CHARTERS: HOW FUNDING 
DISPARITIES HURT COLORADO’S CHARTER SCHOOLS 3, 9 (2008), 
http://facilitiesinitiative.org/media/1231/shortchangedcharters_colorado.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5CZT-T4MZ]; How Are Charters Funded?, TEX. CHARTER SCH. 
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Next Frontier, published in 2010 and 2014, show that the funding 
disparity between traditional public schools and charter schools 
stands between 20% and 30%.64  In each case, public schools receive 
more funding on a per-pupil basis than charter schools, creating a 
considerable funding gap between charter and public schools. 
The funding gap can be partly attributed to two causes: the impact 
of claims made by early proponents of the charter school movement 
who downplayed the importance of funding, combined with the fears 
of education establishment advocates over having less money for 
public schools.  Since the beginning of the charter school movement, 
advocates have argued that charter schools could do more with less — 
the charter school model allowed non-profit and for-profit 
management companies to streamline operations and cut out waste 
such as burdensome collective bargaining agreements or facilities 
service contracts.65  Initially, charter schools were lauded not for 
student achievement, but for their ability to operate efficiently.66  
For-profit management companies like Edison Schools report of their 
ability to generate profit by taking public money and successfully 
running schools at lower costs.67  Indeed, advocates for privatization 
of government services often cite charter schools as evidence that the 
private sector can provide services, such as public education, more 
efficiently than the government could.68  These arguments were 
 
ASS’N, http://www.txcharterschools.org/what-is-a-charter-school/how-are-charters-
funded/ [https://perma.cc/Q46G-SKJW]. See also Myths and Facts, OHIO ALL. FOR 
PUB. CHARTER SCH., http://oapcs.org/myths-and-facts/ [https://perma.cc/5ZM7-
8EEN]. 
 64. INEQUITY PERSISTS, supra note 5, at i (reporting on a subsequent study to 
INEQUITY’S NEXT FRONTIER, which revealed consistent findings using data from fiscal 
year 2006–2007); INEQUITY EXPANDS, supra note 5, at 5 (reporting consistent findings 
using data from fiscal year 2010–2011). 
 65. See, e.g., Corey A. DeAngelis & Ben DeGrow, Charters Do More with Less, 
DETROIT NEWS (Feb. 7, 2018), 
https://www.detroitnews.com/story/opinion/2018/02/07/charters-less/110209770/ 
[https://perma.cc/UT95-2BMA]; CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, CHARTER SCHOOLS: 
TODAY, CHANGING THE FACE OF AMERICAN EDUCATION, STATISTICS, STORIES, AND 
INSIGHTS 7 (Anna Varghese Marcucio et al. eds., 2004); Charter Schools: Finding out 
the Facts, CTR. FOR PUBLIC EDUC. (Mar. 2010), 
http://centerforpubliceducation.org/research/charter-schools-finding-out-facts-0 
[https://perma.cc/74GR-A9DV]. 
 66. See Chester E. Finn, Jr. et al., Where Did They Come from?, in CHARTER 
SCHOOLS IN ACTION: REVIEWING PUBLIC EDUCATION 53, 67–68 (2000). 
 67. See CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, Charter Schools: Today, Changing the Face of 
American Education, Statistics, Stories, and Insights 7 (Anna Varghese Marcucio et 
al. eds., 2004). 
 68. Sandra Vergari, The Politics of Charter Schools, 21 EDUC. POL’Y 15, 17 
(2007). 
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bolstered by studies dating back to James Coleman’s famous report, 
Equality and Equal Education, which found that student body 
characteristics exert greater influence on academic achievement than 
external inputs such as funding.69  In short, the early charter school 
movement was sold on the premise that funding played a minimal 
role in promoting student achievement, and that innovative 
educational programs, teachers, and student body composition were 
primarily responsible for diminishing student risk factors.70 
Simultaneously, education establishment advocates, local school 
boards, and teacher unions argued that funding for public schools 
mattered and that charter schools threatened to take desperately 
needed funds away from public schools.71 Moreover, education 
establishment advocates maintained that public schools must educate 
every child, unlike charter schools that encourage high-cost students 
not to enroll or can simply drop them under the claim that they do 
not meet school specific criteria.72  This practice, the argument goes, 
drives a disproportionate burden of high-cost students to public 
school districts, who must bear the added costs to provide special 
services that exceed state and federal aid. 
There is a third cause of the funding gap that is important to 
consider — that education finance politics at the state and local level 
generally disfavor charter schools.  Indeed, funding disparities 
between charter and public schools tend to be the greatest in states 
that rely primarily on local funding for education.73  Some states 
attempt to offset this by denying access to local funds and 
apportioning larger amounts of state aid to charter schools; however, 
this often does not completely fill the gap and leaves charter schools 
 
 69. See JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 
22, 29 (1966) (finding school environment (for example, integration) had a more 
influential effect on African-American educational achievement than facilities and 
curriculum.  For a more modern take on this argument, see Eric Hanushek, When 
School Finance “Reform” May Not Be Good Policy, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 423 
(1991)). 
 70. See COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 69, at 22; James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and 
Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 286–87, 291 (1999) [hereinafter Schools, Race, and 
Money]. 
 71. See Matthew Arkin & Bryan C. Hassel, The Bottom Line: Six Myths About 
the Financial Impact of Public Charter Schools, NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER 




 72. See Forman, supra note 27, at 840, 852. 
 73. Osberg, supra note 57, at 55–56. 
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vulnerable to state-level funding cuts.74  The combined effect of the 
three reasons for the funding gap — charter school advocates arguing 
they can use funds more effectively and efficiently, public school 
establishment advocates urging that charter schools divert needed 
funds away from public schools, and anti-charter state and local 
education finance politics — result in state statutes that legally 
cement unequal funding schemes.75  Thus, charter schools often fail 
simply because they are unable to finance basic educational 
programs.76 
This has proven to be tremendously problematic.  Despite early 
claims that funding does not matter, there is now data that suggests 
funding can affect student achievement, particularly for charter 
schools serving at-risk youth.77  Charter schools, by and large, educate 
the same student population as public schools,78 and in some districts 
they serve a disproportionate number of at-risk and special needs 
students.  Allocating less funding to charter schools places them on 
unequal footing with traditional public schools, and subject charter 
schools to greater risk of failure should their alternative sources of 
funding run dry.79  Moreover, studies have shown that, rather than 
decrease the amount of funds available to school districts, charter 
schools effectively increase public funds and increase overall 
community investment in public education through additional public 
and private donations.80  Thus, there is an increasing consensus that 
 
 74. INEQUITY’S NEXT FRONTIER, supra note 5, at 14; see also INEQUITY EXPANDS, 
supra note 5, at 23 (stating that charter schools face greater impact than district 
schools when state and local funds are cut). 
 75. See Vergari, supra note 68, at 22–24, 26. 
 76. See Arkin & Hassel, supra note 71, at 7. 
 77. See Schools, Race, and Money, supra note 70, at 285, 292, 296 (stating that 
disadvantaged youth cost more to educate, as they require additional educational 
programs and non-academic services. However, expenditures alone will not increase 
student performance. The greatest influence on achievement is student body 
composition.). 
 78. See Bruno V. Manno, The Case Against Charter Schools: A Proponent 
Responds to the 10 Most Common Complaints About the Charter Movement, AM. 
ASS’N OF SCH. ADM’RS, 
http://www.aasa.org/SchoolAdministratorArticle.aspx?id=10850 
[https://perma.cc/LJ34-ZJGY]. 
 79. Charter Schools and Public Education, supra note 48, at 400–01 (noting that it 
is ironic that conservative think tanks, such as the Thomas B. Fordham Foundation, 
are now arguing that funding matters, given their traditional argument in school 
finance litigation that money is unrelated to student achievement). 
 80. See, e.g., Arkin & Hassel, supra note 71, at 1–2 (stating that successful charter 
schools have the positive effects of improving local communities and increasingly 
cover education expenditures through private donations). 
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in order for charter schools to effectively compete and pursue 
innovative educational, management, and financial programs, they 
must be placed on equal footing with public schools and receive equal 
funding. 
II. NEGOTIATING FOR A CHARTER: AUTHORIZERS AND 
SCHOOL FORMS 
To better understand the charter school funding gap, an analysis of 
the sources of revenue is needed.  Parts II and III examine the charter 
approval process and charter school revenue sources.  Part II 
describes the negotiation process and the inherently disadvantageous 
bargaining position charter schools find themselves in when applying 
for a charter, and how that affects their funding.  Part III describes 
the most resource intensive activities of charter schools — operations, 
start-up funding, facilities, special education, at-risk youth programs, 
and transportation — and discusses different state approaches to 
charter school funding.  These Parts provide a foundation for the 
state and local initiatives proposed in Part IV. 
A. Charters and Authorizers 
Authorizers perform an essential “gate-keeping” function for the 
state. They decide which schools receive charters, enforce the terms 
of those charters, and evaluate whether the school can retain the 
charter after its expiration.81  Authorizers also act as the bridge 
between the regulatory authority of the state and unregulated forms 
of education, such as private religious schools.82  State statutes 
designate various kinds of authorizers, including local education 
agencies, the state education agency, specially created state charter 
school agencies, post-secondary institutions, and, in a small number of 
states, local elected officials.83  The majority of states only give 
chartering authority to the local school district,84 but states with 
 
 81. Sugarman & Kuboyama, supra note 19, at 870. 
 82. See id. at 878.  For an example of a state in which a local school board’s 
approval is required, see WYO. STAT. ANN. § 21-3-305(a) (2018).  For an example of a 
state in which the state education agency acts as a statewide authorizer, see N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 194-B:3 (2018), and for an example of a specially created state 
charter school agency, see MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 37-28-5(c), -7(1) (2018).  Michigan is 
one state in which post-secondary institutions, such as public universities, act as 
authorizers. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.501(2)(a)(iv) (2018).  A mayor of a city in 
which a school district is located may also be an authorizer in Ohio. See OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 3311.86(B) (LexisNexis 2018). 
 83. Sugarman & Kuboyama, supra note 19, at 880–82. 
 84. See id. at 884. 
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multiple authorizers tend to have the most robust charter school 
programs in terms of efficiency and quality.85 
Generally, charter applicants must submit proposals to an 
authorizer.86  Authorizers often publish guidelines with information 
regarding criteria for selecting initial applications, and several districts 
have offered workshops to help would-be applicants.87  Once an 
applicant has passed an initial screening, the authorizer usually 
requests a more detailed proposal, which is then subjected to an 
intense qualitative screening in which the authorizer retains full 
discretion to reject the application.88  The criteria for charter approval 
varies widely from state to state, in large part due to the vagueness of 
authorizing statutes.89  If a charter is denied or not renewed, some 
states provide for an administrative appeals process that may, in turn, 
be appealed in state court.90 
Authorizers play a key role in the success of a charter school.  
Through their application, renewal, and closure decisions, authorizers 
ensure that charter schools remain autonomous, while holding them 
accountable to federal and state education progress goals as well as 
the terms of the charter.  Authorizers know their schools well, 
provide support for struggling programs, and effectively act as a 
“portfolio manager” to attract a diverse set of charter school 
applicants.91  State education agencies could serve in this capacity as 
 
 85. See CHARTER SCHOOL LAWS, supra note 33, at 3–4, 6. 
 86. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-183(A) (2018). 
 87. See, e.g., N.H. DEP’T OF EDUC., CHARTER SCHOOL APPLICATION GUIDELINES 
(Mar. 2012), 
https://www.education.nh.gov/instruction/school_improve/charter/documents/csoapp_
guidelines_2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/HK8S-63CQ]; Sugarman & Kuboyama, supra 
note 19, at 891. 
 88. Sugarman & Kuboyama, supra note 19, at 889–90 (describing Massachusetts’s 
application process). 
 89. See id. at 893–94 (discussing the conflict between state and local governments 
in deciding charter school approval criteria and the different values that such conflicts 
are fought over). 
 90. See, e.g., James Acad. of Excellence v. Dorchester Cty. Sch. Dist. Two, 657 
S.E.2d 469, 471 (S.C. 2008); Sch. Bd. of Volusia Cty. v. Acads. of Excellence, Inc., 974 
So. 2d 1186, 1187 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (affirming reversal of denial of charter 
school application by Department of Education); Cmty. Serv. Leadership Dev. 
Charter Sch. v. Pittsburgh Sch. Dist., 34 A.3d 919, 920 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012) 
(requiring state charter school appeal board to articulate deficiencies in charter 
school application); see also In re Proposed Quest Acad., Charter Sch. of Montclair 
Founders Grp., 2014 WL 7671578, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 26, 2015) 
(reviewing the fifth denial of a charter school application). 
 91. Katherine Destler, Charter Authorizing: It’s a Dirty Job, but Somebody’s Got 
to Do It, in HOPES, FEARS, & REALITY: A BALANCED LOOK AT AMERICAN CHARTER 
SCHOOLS IN 2006 49, 55, 57 (Robin J. Lake & Paul T. Hill eds., 2006). 
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well, but studies show that creating a competitive market for 
authorizing entities generates better schools with closer oversight, 
promoting investment from the authorizer, the charter school itself, 
and the community that the school serves.92 
By contrast, local school boards generally do not make good 
authorizers because of the influence of local politics, inadequate 
infrastructure development, and their tendency to stress compliance-
based accountability.93  Further, public school districts cannot 
successfully act as authorizers because they have an inherent conflict 
of interest with charter schools — public schools directly compete 
with charter schools for enrollment and funding.  There is a growing 
trend to open up the field of authorizers to alternative entities, such 
as independent charter school boards, universities or colleges, state 
boards, local mayors, city councils, non-profit organizations, and 
regional educational entities.94  Such entities not only avoid the 
inherent conflict of interest between public school districts and 
charter schools, they can also stimulate beneficial competition in the 
authorizer field, thereby encouraging experimentation in charter 
authorizing and providing incentives for traditional public school 
districts to improve.95  A mixture of diverse authorizers may thus not 
only improve the function of charter schools themselves, but also 
accelerate systemic reforms in public school governance.96 
 
 92. BRYAN HASSEL ET AL., ECS ISSUE BRIEF: A STATE POLICYMAKER’S GUIDE TO 
ALTERNATIVE AUTHORIZERS OF CHARTER SCHOOLS (Sept. 2005), 
https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED489327.pdf [https://perma.cc/FDD9-TNRG]; see 
also Marc J. Holley et al., Competition with Charters Motivates Districts, EDUC. 
NEXT (2013), https://www.educationnext.org/competition-with-charters-motivates-
districts/ [https://perma.cc/4JG6-ABAG]. 
 93. LOUANN BIERLEIN PALMER & REBECCA GAU, CHARTER SCHOOL 
AUTHORIZING: ARE STATES MAKING THE GRADE? 1 (2003); see also U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, D.C. CHARTER SCHOOLS: STRENGTHENING MONITORING 
AND PROCESS WHEN SCHOOLS CLOSE COULD IMPROVE ACCOUNTABILITY AND EASE 
STUDENT TRANSITIONS 3–4 (2005) (finding that the D.C. Public Charter School 
Board was more effective than the D.C. Public School Board at monitoring charter 
schools in the District of Columbia). 
 94. HASSEL ET AL., supra note 92, at 1–8 (evaluating different charter school 
authorizers); see also supra note 70. 
 95. HASSEL ET AL., supra note 92, at 1–8 (evaluating different charter school 
authorizers); see also supra note 70. 
 96. There is growing literature on what form of regulation ought to be used for 
authorizers — government or market based. See supra note 77. 
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B. Charter School Forms 
As discussed above, the authorizer overseeing the chartering 
process has a great effect on the success of a charter school.  The 
application process for charter authorization is arduous, and most 
successful charter schools allow for at least a two-year buffer between 
announcing their intent to apply for a charter and the official opening 
of the school.97  Part of what makes the chartering process so difficult 
is political, as charter school founders must garner support from 
community members, local politicians, and state education officials to 
successfully obtain authorization. 
But another significant hurdle to opening a charter school is lack of 
start-up funds, leading to reliance on private sources of revenue.98  
Some authorizers provide a bridge loan or aid applicants in obtaining 
state and federal grants to cover start-up costs.99  However, more 
often than not, the authorizer lacks the ability to aid the charter 
school financially, leaving applicants to seek out philanthropic or 
private corporate sponsorship.100  This scarcity of funds inevitably 
influences the choice of form of the charter school.  Charter school 
forms can be plotted on a continuum, from non-profit to for-profit.  
States tend to favor non-profit charter schools because of a perceived 
lack of a financial conflict of interest between the educational needs 
of the students versus the profit-driven motives of a corporation.101  
Charter school operators, however, have created innovative ways to 
combine for-profit and non-profit forms.102 
 
 97. The most successful charter school programs, Knowledge is Power Program 
Network (KIPP) and Achievement First, invest one year in training school leaders in 
school management and designing successful charter schools, and the second year in 
building the school’s organizational infrastructure, hiring teachers, finding a building, 
and working within a targeted community. See generally KNOWLEDGE IS POWER 
PROGRAM, http://www.kipp.org [https://perma.cc/P686-2HN9]; ACHIEVEMENT FIRST, 
http://www.achievementfirst.org/ [https://perma.cc/56QR-ZTLJ]. 
 98. VANDERBILT PEABODY COLL., STARTING STRONG: BEST PRACTICES IN 
STARTING A CHARTER SCHOOL 20 (2013). 
 99. NAT’L ASS’N OF CHARTER SCH. AUTHORIZERS & LOCAL INITIATIVES SUPPORT 
CORP., CHARTER LENDERS & CHARTER AUTHORIZERS: CAN WE TALK? 7 (2015). 
 100. See generally id. 
 101. See John Morley, Note, For-Profit and Non-Profit Charter Schools: An 
Agency Costs Approach, 115 YALE L.J. 1782, 1789 (2006) (discussing the dominance 
of non-profit charter holding entities); see also Charter Schools FAQ, TENN. DEP’T  
EDUC. (2018), https://www.tn.gov/education/school-options/charter-schools/charter-
school-faq.html [https://perma.cc/5X37-XYVL] (noting that charter school entities 
must be non-profit entities that include parents in their governing bodies). 
 102. See Morley, supra note 101; Charter School FAQ, supra note 101. 
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Purely non-profit charter schools are organized under state laws as 
non-profit corporations that qualify for tax exemptions under Internal 
Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3).103  The non-profit entity that holds 
the school’s charter manages the overall strategy, day-to-day 
operations, and directly employs the teachers, administrators, and 
staff.104  This form of charter school includes schools that are legally a 
part of the school district in which they operate, as well as schools 
operated by non-profit management entities hired by the non-profit 
corporation.105  This structure minimizes profit as a motive for the 
school, by having either a government entity or a non-profit manage 
the charter school.  On the opposite end of the continuum are for-
profit business entities that hold the charter and manage the school’s 
operations.106  Such for-profit schools are very rare and are often 
prohibited by state law.107 
In the middle are “hybrid” schools: a non-profit entity receives and 
holds the school’s charter and then contracts with a for-profit firm to 
manage the school’s operations.108  Hybrid schools attempt to 
circumvent state laws that deny for-profit entities from holding a 
school’s charter by having a non-profit entity hold the charter instead.  
In addition, the hybrid model avoids the Department of Education’s 
policy that federal funds only go to non-profit charter schools.109  
Nationally, approximately fourteen to nineteen percent of non-profit 
 
 103. See Morley, supra note 101; Charter School FAQ, supra note 101.  
Organizations that receive a 501(c)(3) designation by the IRS are treated as exempt 
from federal taxation, and donations to such organizations are tax deductible for the 
donor. 
 104. See Morley, supra note 101. 
 105. See, e.g., Sandra Vergari, The Regulatory Styles of Statewide Charter School 
Authorizers: Arizona, Massachusetts, and Michigan, 36 EDUC. ADMIN. Q. 730, 736 
tbl.2 (2000); U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., EVALUATION OF THE PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOLS 
PROGRAM 32–33 (2004) [hereinafter PCSP EVALUATION]. 
 106. Only six states allow a for-profit entity to hold the school’s charter and 
operate the school: Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Virginia, and 
Wisconsin. See generally CHARTER SCHOOL LAWS, supra note 33. 
 107. With the exception of the six states listed in note 42, all other states bar a for-
profit entity from holding a school’s charter.  However, only four states currently 
outright bar for-profit management of a non-profit charter school: Hawaii, Iowa, 
Mississippi, and Tennessee. See generally CHARTER SCHOOL LAWS, supra note 33. 
 108. Morley, supra note 101, at 1790. 
 109. See Evans, supra note 11 (discussing 9th Circuit’s upholding Department of 
Education’s policy). 
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charter schools contract with for-profit management firms for at least 
some services.110 
Hybrid schools can lean toward the non-profit or for-profit ends of 
the charter school form continuum.  This depends on two 
considerations — the extent of the services provided by the for-profit 
management firm, and the fee arrangement between the for-profit 
firm and the non-profit entity that holds the charter.  In terms of the 
kinds of services provided by for-profit firms, some hybrids only 
contract for limited logistical services or curriculum outlines, and thus 
fall closer to the non-profit end.  The Department of Education has 
found, however, that 71% of hybrid schools hired for-profit firms to 
“manag[e] the overall operation or administration of [the] school.”111   
This means that, at least when considering the services provided by 
for-profit firms, most hybrid schools lean towards the for-profit end of 
the spectrum. 
A hybrid school’s fee arrangement may vary depending on whether 
the school’s operating costs are included in the management firm’s 
fee.112  A for-profit management company may receive a fixed fee 
calculated per student, per school, or according to some other 
method.113  The difference between the arrangements centers on 
when operating costs are paid by the management company and what 
effect such costs have on the fee.  Under an arrangement whereby 
operating costs are paid by the charter holding entity in addition to 
the fixed fee, a management company would have little incentive to 
cut costs or quality, except that overspending may render the non-
profit insolvent.114  This is because the management company would 
need to pay the school’s operating costs using a portion of their 
management fees — they receive a fixed fee before such costs are 
paid, regardless of how high or low the operating costs are.  Including 
operating costs within the management firms fixed fee, however, gives 
a for-profit company the greatest incentive to cut costs, since it 
receives the remaining surplus, making the “cost-included” fee 
 
 110. Id.; Morley, supra note 101, at 1790 (citing studies by Arizona State University 
in the early 2000s that examined the market share of for-profit charter schools and 
that, notably, did not consider hybrid schools to be “for-profit”). 
 111. PCSP EVALUATION, supra note 105, at 34 exhibit 3–14.  Sixty-four percent 
have the for-profit firms direct curriculum and instruction, and sixty percent had the 
firms hire staff. Id.  Sixty-four percent of non-profit charter-holding entities in hybrid 
schools also receive seed or start-up money from their for-profit managers. Id. 
 112. Little is known about fee arrangements since most for-profit entities are not 
subject to public reporting requirements. See Morley, supra note 101, at 1792. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
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arrangement the preferred arrangement for for-profit management 
companies.115  This is because the operating costs that the 
management company would need to pay are already built into the 
fee that they receive, so the management company receives the 
benefit of reducing operating costs as much as it can. 
Non-profit charter holders used to dominate the charter school 
market.116  However, a for-profit entity’s ability to “raise capital and 
[to] exploit economies of scale” provides them with significant 
advantages compared to purely non-profit models.117  Whereas purely 
non-profit firms must rely on federal and state grant programs and on 
philanthropic grants, loans, or private donations for start-up money, 
for-profit firms may receive more readily available start-up funds 
from a corporate parent.  As a result, hybrid schools are beginning to 
become popular in the charter school market.118 
This raises a fundamental question: To what extent should public 
charter schools be operated or influenced by non-community 
members?  Early charter school advocates hailed charter schools as a 
return to community-based schooling, with control maintained by a 
cadre of committed education professionals directly accountable to 
parents.119  It is now more likely, however, that a charter school has a 
relationship with a for-profit manager or outside philanthropist, who 
has specific ideas about the structure and function of the school.120  
While this private funding has certainly increased overall investment 
in public education over the past three decades, policymakers must 
ask themselves whether this form of investment compromises the 
goals of public education.  This is because, to a large extent, private 
 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 1794–95.  Morley points to several explanations, including contract 
failure theory for non-profit organizations, high monitoring costs for charter schools 
by parents, donors, and governments, and the non-distribution constraint on non-
profits to self-regulate. Id. at 1795–1810. 
 117. Id. at 1811. 
 118. See generally Alan Singer, Big Profits in Not-for-Profit Charter Schools, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 7, 2014), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/alan-
singer/charter-school-executive-profit_b_5093883.html [https://perma.cc/U4CV-
JB28]. 
 119. See generally supra note 28. 
 120. Several philanthropists have given large amounts of money to finance charter 
school formation, such as the Walton family (Walmart), the Fisher family (the Gap), 
and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. See, e.g., Bryan C. Hassel & Thomas 
Toch, Big Box: How the Heirs of the Wal-Mart Fortune Have Fueled the Charter 
School Movement, AM. INST. FOR RES. (Nov. 7, 2006), https://www.air.org/edsector-
archives/publications/big-box-how-heirs-wal-mart-fortune-have-fueled-charter-school 
[https://perma.cc/Q56C-AGT8]. 
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funding of charter schools has directly filled the void made by 
policymakers when they inequitably fund charter schools through 
public resources.  Understanding the specific sources of public 
funding for charter schools, and how they create a gap, illustrates that 
state policymakers increasingly allow and encourage private 
investment in public schools. 
III. CHARTER SCHOOL FUNDING SOURCES 
Like district public schools, charter schools receive a mixture of 
federal, state, and local funds.  For school districts with over fifteen-
thousand students, the federal, state, and local governments provided 
for, on average, 8.4%, 46.5%, and 45% (respectively) of the district’s 
funds for the 2014–2015 school year.121  Schools receive money from 
the federal government through the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act (ESEA),122 which was substantially modified by the 
No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB),123 the Individual with Disabilities 
Education Act (IDEA),124 and the Every Student Succeeds Act 
(ESSA).125  Typically, a state education system consists of a state 
education agency (SEA) that determines education standards, and 
controls access to federal and state funds.  The SEA often creates, 
evaluates, and distributes funds to local education agencies (LEA), 
also referred to simply as local school districts.  In several states, 
charter schools can organize as their own LEAs.  When doing so, 
charter schools agree to be held directly accountable to certain 
federal and state regulations that attach to specific funding sources.  
 
 121. See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES FOR PUBLIC 
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION: SCHOOL YEAR 2014–15 (FISCAL YEAR 
2015) 4 tbl.1, https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2018/2018301.pdf [https://perma.cc/JM72-
BEMK]. The Department of Education estimated for FY 2009 that it needed to 
disburse $14.3 billion in Title I funds and $12.1 billion in IDEA funds. U.S. DEP’T OF 
EDUC., FUNDS FOR STATE FORMULA-ALLOCATED AND SELECTED STUDENT AID 
PROGRAMS (2010), 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/statetables/11stbystate.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KJ7V-DQ4U].  Charter schools must be treated as other public 
schools for the purpose of distributing ESEA and IDEA funds. U.S. DEP’T EDUC., 
Nonregulatory Guidance, 34 CFR Part 76, Subpart H (Dec. 2000), 
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/guid/cschools/cguidedec2000.doc 
[https://perma.cc/7S7V-UW4X]. 
 122. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 27. 
 123. See generally No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 
Stat. 1425 (2002). 
 124. See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. 
 125. See generally Every Student Succeeds Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114-95, 129 Stat. 
1802.  It is important to note that ESSA substantially modified and replaced 
significant portions of NCLB. 
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The majority of states funnel charter school funding through school 
district LEAs, which are statutorily allowed to withhold and negotiate 
administrative or in-kind service fees, and to charge market rates for 
renting school district property. 
This Part examines the distinctions between funding sources 
available to charter schools against those available to traditional 
public schools even when the two address the same expenditures.  
These expenditures include operation, start-up funding, facilities, 
programs for at-risk youth and special education, and transportation.  
Compared to traditional public schools, charter schools are at a 
disadvantage in covering all these expenditures because traditional 
public schools simply have access to better funding sources or can 
limit their expenditures in ways that charter schools cannot. 
A. Operations 
General operational funding refers to fungible sources of money 
that public schools can use to pay for instruction, student services, 
administration, facilities maintenance, food services, and other 
support services at the school.126  School funding formulas for general 
operations are notoriously complex.  Generally speaking, they 
depend on a whether the state primarily relies on local tax revenues 
or state education expenditures to fund public schools.127  The 
majority of states employ a traditional model of school finance: local 
tax revenues account for the majority of school funding, and the state 
provides aid to equalize disparities between districts.128  Some states, 
such as Michigan, use alternate sources of revenue for school funding 
(such as sales taxes or gambling taxes), which are distributed by the 
SEA to the various school districts according to complex funding 
formulas that weigh student characteristics, geography, and other 
factors.129 
 
 126. For the most recent statistics on how each these sub-functions of a school 
breakdown, see NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES FOR 
PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION: SCHOOL YEAR 2013–14 (FISCAL 
YEAR 2014) 10–11 tbl.4, https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2016/2016301.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RG65-W7A6]. 
 127. See generally 50-State Comparison, supra note 56. 
 128. See generally MANDELKER ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 749–56 (8th ed. 2014) (describing the primary approaches to state 
appropriation of aid to school districts based on the amount of money they can raise 
locally). 
 129. See C. PHILIP KEARNEY & MICHAEL F. ADDONIZIO, A PRIMER ON MICHIGAN 
SCHOOL FINANCE (4th ed. 2002) (describing changes in Michigan school funding 
formulas). 
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To fund charter schools, nearly all states provide state and local 
funding based on an average per-pupil cost (APPC) approach.130  
APPC is calculated by combining the funds that the local school 
district receives from the SEA and from local taxes and dividing that 
sum by the school district’s enrollment.  The resulting dividend travels 
with the student to the charter school.  The rationale behind this 
funding mechanism is that APPC successfully approximates both the 
cost to the state and local government of the student’s education, and 
the amount property-owning parents pay in taxes. 
In theory, when parents choose to send their child to a charter 
school, they shift money away from the sending public school to the 
receiving charter school.  Thus, the rationale goes, the charter school 
should receive the same amount that the state would have spent on 
the child if she had attended a traditional public school.  States differ 
in how they allocate APPC funds, mainly in the percentage of APPC 
to which charter schools are entitled, what “administrative fees” a 
sending school district may be entitled to withhold, whether a sending 
school district should receive “impact aid,” and who controls the flow 
of funds to schools. 
1. Percentage of APPC 
State enabling statutes generally take one of three approaches in 
allocating APPC to charter schools.  The majority of states allocate 
100% of all state and local education funds based on APPC to charter 
schools.131  Eight states set statutory minimums for APPC allocations, 
the lowest at 75%, but give discretion to school districts and the SEA 
to exceed the minimums up to the full amount of APPC funding.132  
Finally, some states give maximum discretion to school districts and 
state education agencies by requiring charter school applicants to 
negotiate the level of public funding they need for the school.133  In 
Wisconsin and Florida, the negotiation process may be beneficial to 
charter schools, as state statutes authorize school districts to exceed 
public school funding levels.134  Finally, some states distinguish 
between granting state aid versus local property tax revenue, 
 
 130. 50-State Comparison, supra note 56. 
 131. CHARTER SCHOOL LAWS, supra note 33. 
 132. See generally id. (Colorado, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New 
York, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Pennsylvania). 
 133. See generally id. (Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, 
Kansas, and Virginia). 
 134. See generally id. (Wisconsin and Florida). 
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depending on whether the charter school was authorized by a state 
agency versus a school district or local entity.135 
There are several flaws with APPC systems.  First, as analyzed 
below, even states that can (or must) provide full funding often do not 
do so.  For example, California schools must receive “operational 
funding that is equal to the total funding that would be available to a 
similar school district serving a similar pupil population.”136  But 
charter schools have administrative fees, rent, and other processing 
costs that traditional public schools do not have to pay.  If the initial 
funding provided is equal per the clause quoted above, but charter 
schools bear costs public schools do not, this results in a 29.3% 
funding gap between charter schools and public schools in 
California.137 
A second flaw is found in states that require charter school 
applicants and the local school board or SEAs to negotiate over the 
appropriate funding level.  This structure ignores the inherent power 
imbalance between the applicant and the government entity.138  Since 
local school boards and charter schools compete for funding and 
students, the local school board has a direct interest in underfunding 
the charter school by requiring payment of high fees for its services.139  
Moreover, because state laws are either vaguely drafted or designed 
to protect public schools from losing money, charter schools are often 
shortchanged.140  Thus, while APPC may be the best proxy to 
determine the appropriate level of operational funding for a charter 
school on a theoretical level, in reality it often leaves charter schools 
without the funds they need to flourish. 
2. Administrative Fees and Impact Aid 
States’ enabling statutes differ on the extent to which a school 
district can withhold administrative costs from the APPC.  
Administrative costs include reasonable fees for using school district 
services to operate the charter school, such as processing reporting 
requirements, providing tests, and other services that must be 
administered by the school district.  Six states currently permit 
 
 135. See generally id. (Texas, South Carolina, and Georgia). 
 136. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47630(a) (West 2008). 
 137. INEQUITY EXPANDS, supra note 5, at 15. 
 138. CHARTER SCHOOL FUNDING GAP, supra note 12, at 5–6. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 4. 
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withholding up to 5% of the APPC for administrative fees.141  In 
states that require the local school board or SEA to negotiate 
appropriate funding levels with the charter school, such 
administrative fees are presumed to be negotiated.142 
When a charter school enrolls a student that previously attended a 
public school, the school district may lose operational revenue it 
needs to pay for fixed contracts and other long-term expenditures.143  
To combat this problem, several states have enacted “impact fees,” 
which require the SEA to continue funding both the sending public 
school and receiving charter school, while it slowly reduces the level 
of aid to the sending public school over a period of three years.144  
Such laws are designed to soften the financial blow to public schools 
for students choosing charter schools. 
In addition to the bargaining power issue raised above, states often 
take administrative fees at face value rather than requiring an actual 
accounting of school district expenditures for services provided to a 
charter school.145  Some school districts, especially those who act as 
the LEA for the charter school, must prepare reports for state and 
federal agencies regarding school progress and administration.146  In 
reality, charter school operators often prepare some portion of these 
reports, yet charter schools must pay the school district administrative 
fees for the whole report.147 
Another funding challenge charter schools face is “hold harmless” 
clauses, which allow school districts to withhold funds allotted to a 
charter school if the school district finds that it is owed payment for 
administrative costs.148  These costs can be substantial; for example, 
 
 141. CHARTER SCHOOL LAWS, supra note 33 (Rhode Island, Oklahoma, Ohio, New 
Mexico, Maryland, and Florida). 
 142. See supra notes 108 and 109. 
 143. See supra notes 57 and 58. 
 144. CHARTER SCHOOL LAWS, supra note 33 (Florida, Massachusetts, New York, 
Rhode Island, and Utah). 
 145. See generally CAL. STATE AUDITOR, CHARTER SCHOOLS: SOME SCHOOL 
DISTRICTS IMPROPERLY AUTHORIZED AND INADEQUATELY MONITORED OUT-OF-
DISTRICT CHARTER SCHOOLS (2017), https://www.bsa.ca.gov/pdfs/reports/2016-
141.pdf [https://perma.cc/YBM2-FE2J]. 
 146. Frequently Asked Questions, CAL. CHARTER SCHOOLS ASS’N, 
http://www.ccsa.org/understanding/faqs/ [https://perma.cc/2SAS-78MG]. 
 147. John Fensterwald, The Big Burden of Charter School Oversight, EDSOURCE 
(Dec. 6, 2016), https://edsource.org/2016/big-burdens-of-charter-school-oversight-
ccsa-carsnet/573868 [https://perma.cc/XAU2-LY9E]. 
 148. See School Funding Practices Keep Dollars in Districts for “Phantom 
Students,” EDUC. NEXT (May 1, 2013), https://www.educationnext.org/school-
100 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVI 
charter schools in St. Louis have reported a 15% shortfall in funding 
as a result of administrative fees withheld by the local school board.149  
Moreover, courts have held that charter schools must share the cost 
of remedial orders, such as desegregation orders, that were in effect at 
the time the school received its charter.150  Because state statutes do 
not penalize school districts for withholding funds, charter schools are 
left with little administrative or private remedy. 
Ultimately, all these clauses, fees, and impact aid erode the general 
purpose of charter schools: to force traditional public schools to 
innovate and become more competitive.  By effectively giving 
traditional public schools more money when a student transfers to a 
charter school, school districts have little financial incentive to 
restructure. 
3. Funds Flow 
State APPC allocations can also be distinguished by considering 
who controls the flow of funds.  State education agencies receive a 
significant amount of money from programs tied to federal 
legislation, such as Title I of the ESEA, IDEA, and other general 
block grants from the federal government.151  State legislatures also 
allocate general funds to support education, which are distributed 
through state education agencies.152  Finally, local governments in 
some states levy property and other taxes, and distribute such 
revenues to local school districts.153  This amalgamation of funding 
sources and schemes has generated a variety of flow structures for 
charter school funding. 
The majority of states allocate all federal and state aid to LEAs, 




 149. See David Hunn & Steve Geigerich, Charter, Public Schools in Funding 
Dispute, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Dec. 3, 2007)  [https://perma.cc/AS9Z-A3BH]. 
 150. See Jenkins v. Kan. City Mo. Sch. Dist., 516 F.3d 1074 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 151. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FISCAL YEARS 2017–2019 STATE TABLES FOR THE U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION (2018), 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/statetables/index.html 
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 152. Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Public School Revenue Sources, in THE 
CONDITION OF EDUCATION (2018), 
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_cma.asp [https://perma.cc/JV7U-5NGU]. 
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 154. See CHARTER SCHOOL LAWS, supra note 33 (California, Iowa, District of 
Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, New Jersey, New Mexico, New 
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minority of states take the opposite approach and rely solely on the 
SEA to allocate funds to charter schools.155  Several states bifurcate 
state and local APPC allocations, requiring both the state and local 
school district to give charter schools their respective share.156  Other 
states allocate funds depending on whether the authorizing entity was 
a SEA, a local school district, or private entity.157  Finally, some states 
authorize charter schools to form as their own LEA, allowing them to 
receive federal and state aid directly, even in states that place control 
of the funds flow in the hands of the school district.158 
Several studies have found that the flow of funds a charter school 
receives greatly impacts the equity of a charter school’s funding, 
especially for federal funds.  Among states that grant full local 
education agency status to charter schools are Minnesota and the 
District of Columbia, where charter schools received $1,083 and 
$1,448 per pupil in federal aid, respectively.159  In 2011, Minnesota’s 
charter schools received $1,167 per pupil in federal funding,160 while 
charter schools in the District of Columbia received $3,016 per pupil 
in federal funding.161  By contrast, states such as Colorado, Florida, 
and Illinois, where charter schools cannot form as local education 
agencies, received $412,162 $645,163 and $922,164 respectively, per pupil 
in federal aid in 2011.  Missouri provides an even better example of 
the importance of local education agency status for charter schools: 
prior to amending its charter school law in 2006 to allow charter 
schools to form as local education agencies, Missouri charter schools 
received 28.8% percent less funding than traditional public schools.165  
After the amendment, Missouri charter schools received 3% more 
funding compared to traditional public schools in 2011.166  Charter 
schools that become LEAs take on greater responsibility to educate 
 
York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming). 
 155. Id. (Delaware, New Hampshire, Hawaii, Minnesota, Nevada, and Ohio). 
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 158. Osberg, supra note 57, at 59. 
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students with special needs and socioeconomic challenges and are 
subject to greater reporting requirements, but the difference in 
funding is profound. 
B. Start-Up Funding 
1. Public Charter Schools Program 
ESSA gives states the flexibility to adopt a variety of assessments 
while preserving NCLB’s annual assessment requirement.167  Charter 
schools in each state can be held accountable to goals and progress 
targets set by the state.168  Under ESSA, schools that fail to meet the 
state’s benchmarks will face intervention, and possible closure, 
according to the state’s charter school law.169  ESSA is intended to 
remove, to the greatest extent possible, federal micromanagement of 
state charter school accountability standards.170  These accountability 
measures for failing charter schools focus on a policy holding that 
parents deserve to choose where their child is educated, which is 
different from other reform efforts that target desegregation and 
equitable school funding.171 
To improve school choice, the Public Charter Schools Program 
(PCSP) provides competitive grants to SEAs who, in turn, allocate 
these funds to LEAs to help the planning, program design, and initial 
implementation of new charter schools.172  The federal Department 
of Education provides dissemination grants to charter schools that 
have “demonstrated ‘overall success,’ including academic 
achievement, high level of parental satisfaction, and strong 
management and leadership.”173  If the SEA chooses not to 
 
 167. Every Student Succeeds Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114-95 §1111(b)(2), 129 Stat. 
1802. 
 168. Every Student Succeeds Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114-95 §1111I(4)(C), 129 Stat. 
1802. 
 169. Every Student Succeeds Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114-95 §1111(d)(1)(B), 129 Stat. 
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 170. See 20 U.S.C. § 7371 (2015). 
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 173. Id. 
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participate in the PCSP, individual charter school developers may 
apply directly to the Department of Education for a grant.174 
The ESSA expanded state-level charter school grants by creating a 
competitive application process for state education agencies.175  
Through the competitive grants, state education agencies are 
encouraged to adopt ambitious charter school objectives and to give 
charter schools a greater degree of flexibility.176  In 2016, the 
Department of Education awarded $206 million in grants under this 
competitive grant program, resulting in the expansion of charter 
school programs in California, Florida, Georgia, Massachusetts, 
Tennessee, and Washington.177  The competitive grant process will 
ideally result in greater public awareness of the mission of the charter 
school movement, which is to improve school choice for students and 
parents and to achieve equitable funding for charter schools on par 
with traditional public schools. 
2. State Categorical Grants 
Many studies have identified inadequate start-up funding for 
textbooks, computers, and equipment as a barrier to charter school 
creation.178    Lack of start-up funding especially hurts charter schools 
created by parents and communities, because they often lack the 
resources of large network charter schools or those managed by 
better-financed private companies.179 
Federal funding under the PCSP has alleviated some of the 
concerns over start-up funding and, with the exception of Maryland 
and Missouri, every state and the District of Columbia offer federal 
start-up funds.180  To supplement PCSP grants, some state education 
agencies also provide grants181 or low- or zero-interest loans.182  For 
 
 174. Id. 
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 180. Charter Schools: Does the State Provide Start-Up or Planning Grants to New 
Charter Schools? 50-State Comparison, EDUC. COMMISSION OF THE STATES (Jan. 
2018), http://ecs.force.com/mbdata/mbquestNB2C?rep=CS1718 
[https://perma.cc/KVM7-RWMZ]. 
 181. Id. (Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and 
Utah). 
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example, Minnesota charter schools are eligible for aid to pay start-up 
costs and additional operating costs in the amount of $500 per 
student, in addition to a minimum of fifty thousand dollars $50,000 
per school.183  In Arizona, New Mexico, and Oklahoma, state 
legislatures created a state stimulus fund for charter school start-up 
and facility’s needs.184  Indiana also awards grants to new charter 
schools and charter schools with growing enrollments to allow the 
school to scale up.185  Some states provide aid contingent upon a lack 
of available federal funds.186  However, due to the existence of 
federal aid, at least one state legislature has declined to fund these 
programs.187 
C. Facilities 
The rising costs of facilities for charter schools have garnered 
increased attention because of the schools’ lack of financing 
options.188  Facilities can be a costly problem for charter schools for 
several reasons.  First, former public-school buildings that are in good 
condition and a suitable location are rarely available.  Second, such 
buildings must often be remodeled or otherwise adapted to the needs 
of the charter school.  Many charter schools start with one grade and 
plan to expand incrementally until they can serve a full range of 
grades; moving locations repeatedly is a costly distraction, and schools 
would be better served by settling into a long-term lease. 
Another set of issues arises when it comes to large-scale financing.  
Low-cost, low-rate loans and mortgages for large sums of money are 
often hard to come by,189 and charter schools are perceived as a risk 
in the public capital market, adding additional expenses.190  Charter 
 
 182. Id. (California, Illinois, Louisiana, New York, New Mexico, and Oklahoma). 
 183. Id.; see also MINN. STAT. § 124E.20 (2018). 
 184. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-188 (2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-8B-14 (West 
2018); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 3-144 (West 2018). 
 185. IND. CODE ANN. § 20-49-9-1 et seq. (West 2018) (Charter and Innovation 
School Advance Program). 
 186. See 16 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-77.1-4 (West 2018). 
 187. See, e.g., N.Y. EDUC. CODE § 2856 (West 2018). 
 188. See N.Y. UNIV. STEINHARDT SCH. OF EDUC. INST. FOR EDUC. & SOC. POLICY, 
THE FINANCE GAP: CHARTER SCHOOLS AND THEIR FACILITIES (2004), 
https://steinhardt.nyu.edu/scmsAdmin/uploads/001/117/FinanceGap.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/76HF-9LKK]. 
 189. KAUFFMAN FOUND., DEBUNKING THE REAL ESTATE RISK OF CHARTER 
SCHOOLS (2005), https://www.edreform.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Debunking-
Real-Estate-Risk-Charter-Schools.pdf [https://perma.cc/DKK8-4X9D]. 
 190. Id. at 1–2. 
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schools attempting to obtain funding in order to improve existing 
facilities or begin construction on new ones are hindered by perceived 
risks in granting bond financing, by inequities and ambiguities in 
statutes and tax regulations, and by hostile or unsupportive political 
environments.191  A private non-profit lending sector has emerged to 
cope with the increasing capital demands of charter schools, but it is 
still small, and non-profit lenders remain just as wary as for-profit 
lenders about charter school stability.192  This has led the federal 
government and several states to develop state charter school 
facilities aid programs and to establish public-private partnerships to 
create innovative financing models. 
1. Federal Programs 
Charter schools rely on several federal programs to improve or 
build facilities.  The Department of Education operates two grant 
programs: the Credit Enhancement for Charter School Facilities 
Program (Credit Enhancement program)193 and the State Charter 
School Facilities Incentive Grants Program (Incentive Grants 
program).194  Additionally, PCSP provides leverage funds through the 
Credit Enhancement for Charter School Facilities Program.195  Under 
the Credit Enhancement program, public and nonprofit entities can 
compete to receive and leverage federal funds to help charter schools 
obtain school facilities through purchase, lease, donation, 
construction, and renovate of school facilities.196  Grant recipients 
may, among other things, receive funds to guarantee and insure 
physical plant debt and leases for personal and real property.  They 
also help obtain financing for a charter school’s facilities by 
 
 191. INEQUITY’S NEXT FRONTIER, supra note 5, at 13–15; INEQUITY EXPANDS, 
supra note 5, at 34–37. 
 192. See LOCAL INITIATIVES SUPPORT CORP., 2014 CHARTER SCHOOL FACILITY 
FINANCE LANDSCAPE 2 (2007), 
http://www.lisc.org/media/filer_public/59/38/5938b90b-07cc-411c-845f-
431f50a4682e/2014csflandscape.pdf [https://perma.cc/CP97-BN3E]. 
 193. 20 U.S.C. § 7221c (2018); see also 2014 CHARTER SCHOOL FACILITY FINANCE, 
supra note 192, at 3. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Credit Enhancement for Charter School Facilities Program Description, U.S. 
DEP’T EDUC. (2018), https://innovation.ed.gov/what-we-do/charter-schools/credit-
enhancement-for-charter-school-facilities-program/ [https://perma.cc/F2XS-SYCM].  
This program gives charter schools money for the sole purpose of guaranteeing the 
school’s debts, so that the school is a more acceptable credit risk for potential lenders. 
Id.; see also 2014 CHARTER SCHOOL FACILITY FINANCE, supra note 192, at 29. 
 196. Credit Enhancement for Charter School Facilities Program Description, supra 
note 195. 
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identifying potential lending sources, by encouraging private lending, 
and through other similar activities.  Finally, they establish charter 
school facility “incubators” that new charter schools can use until 
they acquire a facility of their own.197  The program is designed to 
meet the perceived lack of facilities funding available to charter 
schools.198 
The federal government also operates the State Charter School 
Facilities Incentive Grants program to assist charter schools with 
facility costs.  Through the Incentive Grants program, the federal 
government provides funds to states so that they can establish and 
administer per-pupil facilities aid programs.199  Currently, fourteen 
states provide some form of per-pupil facilities aid for charter 
schools.200  The Incentive Grants program is intended “to encourage 
more states to develop and expand per-pupil facilities aid programs” 
by covering a part of the states’ share in the costs associated with 
charter schools facilities funding.201  The Center for Education 
Reform has hailed a per-pupil expenditure as a model aid to 
encourage development of charter school facilities.202 
In addition to the two grant programs administered by the 
Department of Education, the federal government oversees various 
other programs for charter schools to tap into to finance facilities’ 
needs.  Many charter schools receive distributions from the Treasury 
Department’s New Markets Tax Credit Program (NMTC), which 
 
 197. Id. 
 198. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., A COMMITMENT TO QUALITY: NATIONAL CHARTER 
SCHOOL POLICY FORUM REPORT 4 (2008), 
https://www2.ed.gov/admins/comm/choice/csforum/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJD2-
WC7C] (calling for additional facilities financing for charter schools); see also 2014 
CHARTER SCHOOL FACILITY FINANCE, supra note 192, at 29. 
 199. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., STATE CHARTER SCHOOL FACILITIES INCENTIVE 
GRANTS PROGRAM DESCRIPTION, 
http://www.ed.gov/programs/statecharter/gtepstatecharter.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CXL9-Z4SX]. 
 200. See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 17078.52–.66 (West 2018); D.C. CODE § 38-2908 
(2018); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 124E.22(d) (West 2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53G-5-103 
(West 2018); AK STAT. ANN. § 14.11.126 (West 2018); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 15-188 
(West 2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-43.7-110.3 (West 2018); FL. STAT. ANN. § 1013.62 
(West 2018); GEORGIA STAT ANN. § 20-2-2068.2 (West 2018); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 33-
5208 (West 2018); IND. CODE § 20-24-7-11 and § 20-24-12-5 (West 2018); LA. CODE § 
3995 (West 2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS 69 § 1M (West 2018); MISS. STAT. §37-41-1 et seq. 
(West 2018); OHIO REV. CODE § 3318.50 (West 2018); OK. STAT. ANN. § 3-144 (West 
2018); 24 PENN. STAT. § 17-1731-A (West 2018); TENN. CODE § 49-13-112 (West 2018). 
 201. See supra note 157. 
 202. CHARTER SCHOOL FUNDING GAP, supra note 12, at 5. 
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encourages private sector investments in distressed communities.203  
Operated through the Community Development Financial 
Institutions Fund (CDFI), NMTC provides a credit against Federal 
income taxes for investors that make “qualified equity investments” 
in “community development entities” (CDE).204  CDFI allocates a 
certain number of tax credits to CDEs who, in turn, offer the credits 
to investors in exchange for a “qualified equity investment” in the 
CDE.205  The CDE then uses the proceeds of these investments to 
make “qualified low-income community investments” in “qualified 
active low-income community businesses” (QALICB), which are 
typically businesses and real estate projects located in targeted low-
income communities.206  Out of the $3.5 billion that the Treasury 
Department allocated to various CDEs for distribution in 2017, CDFI 
allocated $800 million to eight non-profit lenders that have funded 
charter schools as QALICBs for capital improvement projects.207  
The General Accounting Office credited NMTC for increasing 
private investment in low-income communities.208  NMTC allows 
charter schools located in low-income communities a route to attract 
investors and receive low-cost private financing.  Since 2008, the 
 
 203. Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, §121 
(West).  NMTC is codified in § 45D of the Internal Revenue Code. 
 204. The credit is taken over a seven-year period, amounting to five percent for the 
first three years and six percent for the final four, totaling a substantial 39% of the 
total original investment. I.R.C. § 45D(a).  For example, if CDFI allocates $1 million 
to a CDE, who offers the tax credit to investor for a $1 million equity investment in a 
QALICB, the investor will receive a $50,000 tax credit for the first three years and a 
$60,000 tax credit for the next four, totaling $390,000 in total tax credits over the life 
of the investment. See CMTY. DEV. FIN. INSTS. FUND, NEW MARKETS TAX CREDIT 
PROGRAM 2017 APPLICATION INSTRUCTIONS (2017), 
https://www.cdfifund.gov/Documents/2017%20Online%20Application%20Instruction
s.pdf [https://perma.cc/DEY3-MPDA]. 
 205. I.R.C. § 45D(b). 
 206. I.R.C. § 45D(d) (“qualified low-income investment”); I.R.C. § 45D(d)(2) 
(QALICB); I.R.C. § 45D(e) (defining “low-income community” to mean any census 
tract if (a) the poverty rate is at least 20%, (b) if tract not located in metropolitan 
area, the median family income does not exceed 80% of statewide median family 
income, or (c) if tract located in metropolitan area, the median family income does 
not exceed 80% of the statewide or metropolitan family income). 
 207. See 2014 CHARTER SCHOOL FACILITY FINANCE LANDSCAPE, supra note 192, 
at 34. 
 208. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NEW MARKETS TAX CREDIT APPEARS 
TO INCREASE INVESTMENT BY INVESTORS IN LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES, BUT 
OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO BETTER MONITOR COMPLIANCE 4 (2007), 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07296.pdf [https://perma.cc/J4J7-RJLS]. 
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NMTC program has injected over $1.894 billion into charter schools 
in low-income communities.209 
Finally, the Department of Agriculture’s Rural Development’s 
Community (RDC) Program provides loans, guarantees, and grants 
for essential community facilities in rural areas and in towns up to 
20,000 in population.210  Guaranteed and direct loan funds may be 
used for construction, renovation, or improvement of facilities, as well 
as refinancing in certain cases.211  As of 2013, the RDC has provided 
loans, guarantees, and grants totaling $510.1 million for charter school 
projects in thirteen states.212 
2. State Programs 
State facilities funding programs come in a variety of forms.  States 
usually require either the SEA or local school districts to maintain a 
list of vacant or underutilized buildings suitable to house charter 
schools.213  Some states, such as Delaware, have enacted provisions 
that require the government entity that owns the building to give 
charter schools the right of first refusal for purchase and lease.214  
These provisions also often include clauses that require the 
government owner to negotiate “in good faith” or use the “fair 
market value” when selling, purchasing or leasing the property.215  
The District of Columbia, for example, gives charter schools a 25% 
discount from the “non-profit rate” when selling vacant or unused 
buildings to charter schools.216  Florida gives land developers the 
option of providing charter school facilities in a new development as 
an alternative to paying impact fees to the local school district.217  
Further, several states require that school districts provide 
 
 209. Charter School Facility Financing: New Markets Tax Credit Program, LOCAL 
INITIATIVES SUPPORT CORP. (2017), http://www.lisc.org/charter-schools/funding-
options/us-department-treasury/new-markets-tax-credit-program/ 
[https://perma.cc/J5UW-WLP3]. 
 210. See Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act of 1972, 7 U.S.C. § 
1926(a)(1) (2018). 
 211. See 2014 CHARTER SCHOOL FACILITY FINANCE LANDSCAPE, supra note 192, 
at 35. 
 212. Id. 
 213. CHARTER SCHOOL LAWS, supra note 33 (Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, 
District of Columbia, Florida, Louisiana, Nevada, New York, Oregon, South 
Carolina, and Virginia). 
 214. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 504A(6) (West 2018). 
 215. Id. 
 216. D.C. CODE § 38-1802.09 (2018). 
 217. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1002.33(18)(f) (West 2018). 
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“equivalent facilities” to charter schools and public schools, which 
allows charter schools to pay only ordinary maintenance costs and 
possibly below market rent.218  More often than not, all of these 
various aid programs apply only to charter schools that utilize old 
school district buildings.  These policies are intended to place 
underutilized school and government building back in productive use, 
as well as to help charter schools with their facilities financing. 
Despite policies that make unused school buildings available to 
charter schools, possibly free of charge, facilities maintenance, repair, 
and renovation can still be costly.  To address this, several states 
created programs that grant aid to charter schools on a per-pupil 
basis, which is intended to cover the cost of rent, maintenance, and 
repair.219  For example, Minnesota provides the lesser of $1,314 per 
pupil or 90% of the actual lease costs in order to cover their facilities 
expenditures.220  Other state aid programs target renovation, 
remodeling, and new construction costs by providing grants to charter 
schools directly.221  Alternatively, rather than create a separate 
charter school facilities aid program, Hawaii and North Carolina 
permit charter schools to apply for facilities aid normally reserved for 
public schools.222 
Finally, the state might help charter schools with facilities funding 
by granting charter schools limited access to public debt financing.  
Some states have given special state governmental authorities the 
power to issue low interest loans or bonds on behalf of a charter 
school.223  Other states have authorized local government units, 
mostly school districts and cities, to issue bonds on behalf of the 
 
 218. CHARTER SCHOOL LAWS, supra note 33, at 14 (California’s Proposition 39). 
 219. See id. at 15, 17, 27, 49, 57, 63, 65, 73, 75, 91 (California, Colorado, Georgia, 
Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, and Wyoming). 
 220. MINN. STAT. § 124E.22(c) (West 2018). 
 221. See generally ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 15-188 (2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-30.5-
402 (2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-8B-14 (West 2018); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 3-
144 (West 2018). 
 222. HAW. REV. STAT. § 302A-1502.4(b) (2018) (allowing non-profit and for-profit 
entities to apply for an allocation through Hawaii’s 3R’s school repair and 
maintenance fund); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159D-35 et seq. (2018) (Private Capital 
Facilities Finance Act allows non-profit elementary and secondary schools to apply 
for facilities grants and low-cost loans). 
 223. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 23-15-101 et seq. (2018) (Colorado Educational 
and Cultural Facilities Authority); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10a-176 et seq. (2018) 
(Connecticut Health and Educational Facilities Authority); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
3501/805-5 (2018) (Illinois Finance Authority Act); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 
12.192(VI)(A) (2018) (Michigan Public Educational Facilities Authority). 
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charter school.224  Alternatively, states might allow charter schools to 
participate in local bond elections for public school facilities.225  
Finally, Arizona and Delaware consider charter schools as economic 
development programs and allow them to apply for industrial 
development bonds through the local government.226  All of these 
policies allow charter schools to access public debt by creating or 
utilizing an intermediary governmental authority for the purpose of 
securing issued bonds. 
3. Local Programs 
Public school districts typically rely on local taxes for a significant 
portion of their budgets, and on bonds issued by the local school 
district for financial capital improvements to facilities.  By contrast, 
charter schools receive almost 70% of their funding from the state, on 
average, with the remainder coming from federal funds distributed 
through state education authorities.227  Several states even deny 
charter schools access to local funds, though they attempt to 
compensate for this by granting access to state funds.228  In Inequity’s 
Next Frontier, Inequity Persists, and Inequity Expands, the authors 
found that, in practice, most local governments do not allow charter 
schools to access local tax revenue for operational or facilities 
funds.229  As discussed above, states have attempted to make up for 
this gap by providing additional funds and debt financing methods, 
but states still grant only partial access to local funding. 
An interesting public-private partnership has developed in 
Indianapolis, Indiana.  Indianapolis is the only city in the country 
where the mayor’s office acts as the primary authorizer of local 
charter schools.230  In 2002, the Indianapolis Mayor’s Charter Schools 
Office and the Indianapolis Local Public Improvement Bond Bank, in 
partnership with the Annie E. Casey Foundation, JPMorgan Chase 
Bank, and Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC), developed a 
 
 224. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-30.5-404(2)(a) (2018). 
 225. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-30.5-404(1)(a) (2018). 
 226. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35 (West 2018) (allowing counties, cities, 
school districts, and other political subdivisions that support industrial development 
to represent a charter school); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 29, § 5051 et seq. (West 2018) 
(Delaware Economic Development Authority). 
 227. Osberg, supra note 57, at 55, 58–59. 
 228. Id. at 55–56. 
 229. See INEQUITY’S NEXT FRONTIER, supra note 5, at 15–16; INEQUITY PERSISTS, 
supra note 5, at 11–13; INEQUITY EXPANDS, supra note 5, at 34–36. 
 230. See IND. CODE §§ 20-24-2.3-3.1 to -3.5 (2018). 
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facilities loan program for Mayor-sponsored charter schools.231  The 
Bond Bank serves as a conduit for a $20 million loan from JPMorgan 
Chase Bank and relends the proceeds to individual schools.232  The 
City of Indianapolis attaches a moral obligation clause to guarantee 
all of the loans made to charter schools, while LISC and the Annie E. 
Casey Foundation provide additional limited guarantees — this gives 
charter schools access to tax-exempt debt at rates that benefit from 
the City’s AAA credit rating.233  This type of partnership between 
non-profit, for-profit, and government entities may be a sign of future 
integration between private and public debt markets to support public 
initiatives. 
D. At-Risk Youth Programs 
Charter schools typically serve a disproportionate number of socio-
economically disadvantaged students that qualify for both federal and 
state aid programs.234  Despite this, charter schools receive less of the 
funding attached to federal and state aid programs because local 
school districts control the flow of funds as LEAs or state grant 
recipients, leaving charter schools in a poor negotiating position to 
ask for increased funding.235 
Title I of the ESEA establishes a framework for federal support, 
and creates accountability for schools, LEAs, and SEAs.236  It offers 
financial support for schools educating children from low-income 
families237 and is one of the most heavily funded federal education 
programs.  Because of the high correlation between poverty and low 
academic achievement, supporting economically disadvantaged 
students is a central concern of the government.238  The purpose of 
Title I is “to provide all children significant opportunity to receive a 
fair, equitable, and high-quality education[.]”239 
 
 231. 2014 CHARTER SCHOOL FACILITY FINANCE LANDSCAPE, supra note 192, at 48. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
 234. See Improving Basic Programs Operated by Local Educational Agencies 
(Title I, Part A) Program Description, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
https://www2.ed.gov/programs/titleiparta/index.html [https://perma.cc/LAU3-7K6J] 
[hereinafter Improving Basic Programs]. 
 235. See id. 
 236. See generally id. 
 237. See id. 
 238. See id. 
 239. 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2018). 
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Title I grants funding that may be used for additional staff, 
professional development, extended-time programs, and other 
strategies that raise student achievement in high-poverty schools.240  
Schools are not required to participate in Title I unless they want to 
receive additional funds.  Grants are made to LEAs based on the 
number of economically disadvantaged children in each education 
agency’s school district.241  Recent studies have found that grants to 
SEAs vary between states, and that grants to LEAs within states also 
differ, creating wide disparities in Title I funding for at-risk youth.242 
Title I defines charter schools as including both elementary and 
secondary schools.243  However, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit validated a Department of Education policy that declared for-
profit charter schools ineligible to receive federal funding under 
IDEA and ESEA.244  As discussed earlier, whether a charter school 
can organize as a LEA has a profound effect on the amount of money 
it will actually receive in Title I funds: charter schools tied to LEAs 
receive around 4% more money than unassociated charter schools.245 
State programs vary depending upon the infrastructure of at-risk 
youth programs already in place.  Some states require the school 
district to administer all categorical aid programs to charter schools, 
who must negotiate the appropriate level of service and the extent to 
which the charter school itself will provide services.246  This is 
particularly the case for free-and-reduced lunch programs as some 
charter schools lack the facilities necessary to house a cafeteria.  
Other states allow charter schools to compete with other public 
schools for categorical funds that target at-risk youth.247  Finally, very 
few states have at-risk youth programs specifically for charter schools, 
 
 240. See generally Improving Basic Programs, supra note 234. 
 241. 20 U.S.C. § 6333(a), (c) (2018).  Local education agencies are a “public board 
of education or other public authority legally constituted within a State for either 
administrative control or direction of . . . public elementary schools or secondary 
schools.” 20 U.S.C. § 7801(30)(a) (2018); see also supra Section III.A. 
 242. See Goodwin Liu, Improving Title I Funding Across States, Districts, and 
Schools, 93 IOWA L. REV. 973, 993–94 (2008). 
 243. 20 U.S.C. § 7801(19), (45) (2018). 
 244. See Ariz. State Bd. for Charter Sch. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 464 F.3d 1003, 
1010 (9th Cir. 2006); see Evans, supra note 11, at 640.  While the ruling only applies 
to for-profit charter schools, there is some question as to whether the Department’s 
policy will chill the growth of charter schools across the country. See id. at 641–43. 
 245. See supra Section III.A.3. 
 246. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71B, § 14 (2018); see generally MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 71, § 89 (2018). 
 247. See, e.g., ESEA Competitive Grant Programs, WIS. DEP’T PUB. INSTRUCTION, 
https://dpi.wi.gov/esea/historical/funding/competitive [https://perma.cc/6XUD-3SD6]. 
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which allow charter schools to have automatically increased funding 
for students that qualify for such aid.  Such programs typically exist in 
states where charter schools serving at-risk youth are favored over 
schools serving non-qualifying students. 
E. Special Education 
IDEA provides the framework within which public schools provide 
special education.  IDEA is premised on the fact that it is almost 
twice as expensive to educate a child with special needs compared to 
a child without such needs.248  To ease this financial burden, IDEA 
facilitates distribution of federal funds to SEAs based on a state 
appropriation formula.249  The SEAs then make sub-grants to LEAs 
to pay for “free and appropriate public education” (FAPE) for 
special needs children.250  While state participation in the program is 
not mandatory, the federal government provides a significant 
financial incentive for states to participate by subsidizing the cost of 
providing FAPE for children with disabilities.251 
To be eligible for IDEA funds, state and local education agencies 
must ensure that all eligible students are receiving FAPE.252  Local 
school officials must work together with parents, counselors, and 
other professionals to create an “individualized education plan” 
(IEP) for every qualifying student.253  Students must also be taught in 
the “least restrictive environment” such that, to the maximum extent 
appropriate, children with disabilities should be educated alongside 
children without disabilities.254  IDEA thus obligates school districts 
to support education for students with disabilities even if the cost of 
doing so is far higher than the cost of supporting non-disabled 
students.  IDEA has generated a considerable volume of litigation.255  
 
 248. See NANCY LEE JONES ET AL., INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION 
ACT (IDEA): BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 117 (2004). 
 249. 20 U.S.C. § 1411(d) (2018); see JONES ET AL., supra note 248, at 45. 
 250. 20 U.S.C. § 1411(f)(1), (3) (2018); see JONES ET AL., supra note 248, at 87. 
 251. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A)–(2) (2018); see also Dixie Snow Huefner, 
Updating the FAPE Standard Under IDEA, 37 J. L. & EDUC. 367 (2008) (examining 
the Supreme Court’s Rowley decision’s impact on the FAPE standard); H. 
RUTHERFORD TURNBULL, III, FREE APPROPRIATE PUBLIC EDUCATION: THE LAW 
AND CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES (4th ed. 1993). 
 252. Grants to States for Education of Children with Disabilities Program 
Description, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (2016), 
https://www2.ed.gov/programs/osepgts/index.html [https://perma.cc/H7NS-QS4V]. 
 253. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)–(2)(A) (2018). 
 254. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2018). 
 255. See generally Huefner, supra note 251. 
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Similar to ESEA, IDEA includes public charter schools in its 
definitions of “elementary school” and “secondary school,”256 but the 
Department of Education has promulgated regulations limiting the 
act to cover only non-profit charter schools.257 
Money allocated under IDEA is distributed from the federal 
government to SEAs, which allocate the funds to the LEAs 
responsible for providing the special education services to students.258  
At the local level, the challenge of implementing special education in 
charter schools stems from an inherent tension between special 
education and parental choice — how to reconcile parent choice with 
centralized special education team decision making.  This is 
exacerbated by special education regulations and charter school laws 
that exempt charter schools from regulations.259  Special education 
funding is a sensitive topic in school finance, and the various 
mechanisms designed by state legislatures to fund special education 
reflect the underlying frustration of school districts, who pay a 
significant portion of special education costs from general operation 
funds because special education resources are essentially 
underfunded by state and federal mandates.260 
Due to their small size, low enrollments, limited staff, and targeting 
of at-risk youth, charter schools may be disproportionately affected 
by the costs associated with special education.261  The high costs of 
special education could diminish, if not altogether destroy, a charter 
school’s ability to operate effectively.262  Expenditures for “high 
need” or “high cost” students can exceed thirteen times that of a 
general education student.263  Also, because most charter school 
 
 256. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(6), (27) (2018). 
 257. See supra note 27. 
 258. See CTR. FOR IDEA FISCAL REPORTING, QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE ON THE 
ALLOCATION OF IDEA PART B SUBGRANTS TO LOCAL EDUCATION AGENCIES 1 
(2017), https://cifr.wested.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/CIFR-QRG-LEA-
Allocations.pdf [https://perma.cc/J347-VGKV]. 
 259. See EILEEN M. AHEARN ET AL., PROJECT SEARCH: SPECIAL EDUCATION AS 
REQUIREMENTS IN CHARTER SCHOOLS, FINAL REPORT OF A RESEARCH STUDY 43 
(2001), http://www.nasdse.org/Portals/0/Documents/ProjectSearch.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UW2S-FTVH] [hereinafter PROJECT SEARCH]. 
 260. VENTURESOME CAPITAL, supra note 46, at 38. 
 261. See PROJECT SEARCH, supra note 259, at 4–5. 
 262. See id. at 38; see also J.P. Heubert, Schools Without Rules? Charter Schools, 
Federal Disability Law, and the Paradoxes of Deregulation, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 301 (1997). 
 263. OFFICE OF SPECIAL EDUC. AND REHAB. SERVS., U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., A NEW 
ERA: REVITALIZING SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES 
(2002), 
2019] FORDHAM URB. L.J. 115 
admissions use a lottery system and target at-risk youth, a school may 
have a disproportionate number of special needs or undiagnosed 
special needs applicants compared to other schools in the state or 
district.264  While some states have special funds for high-cost 
students, a significant portion of the underfunded costs are borne by 
the school.265  As a result, several studies have documented that 
charter schools “struggle to amass the fiscal and human capacity” to 
comply with federal and state law.266 
State statutes often do not explicitly dictate how special education 
funds should be distributed to charter schools.  In ten states, the 
charter school law is silent regarding special education funding.267  A 
slew of state laws simply reiterate IDEA’s language mandating that 
students with disabilities receive a “proportionate” or 
“commensurate” share of federal and state special education funds.268  
Some states take a different approach.  Massachusetts, for example, 
has specific provisions that limit a charter school’s fiscal responsibility 
for students who attend the school but do not require placement in a 
separate day or residential living environment.269  All states use 
various funding formulas based on the number of special education 
children in the school, the type of disability, grade, level of service 
needs, or total student population.270  Barring specific language, the 
flow of special education funds largely depends on whether a charter 
school is organized as a LEA. 
States have developed three models to fund special education in 
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LEA.271  If a charter school is its own LEA, or operates 
independently from the local school district, then it assumes the full 
fiscal and programmatic responsibility for special education, and has 
“no link” to the local school district’s special education services.272  
Such charter schools, however, remain responsible for evaluating the 
kinds of services required by special needs students.  This evaluation 
carries with it the risk of having to educate a large number of “high 
cost” students.  Some “no link” states have developed programs to 
reduce this risk.  Indiana charter schools may join a cooperative that 
provides special education support.273  Ohio employs program 
support run by governmental entities that provide all public schools 
with special education services, called Educational Service Centers.274  
Rhode Island requires charter schools to inform parents of “high 
costs” students that they will have difficulty meeting the child’s needs, 
and, in some cases, requires the school to pay for such a student’s 
enrollment in a private school that provides adequate special 
education services, if requested by the student’s parents.275 
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If a charter school is part of a LEA, usually the local school district, 
then the fiscal and programmatic responsibilities may be provided 
solely by the LEA (“total link”) or shared between the LEA and the 
charter school (“partial link”).276  In total link states, the LEA 
(without the charter school) provides all special education services 
and funding.  Generally, total link states follow one of three models: a 
strict oversight and control model, a contract model, or an insurance 
model.277  Under the strict oversight and control model, states such as 
Hawaii and Kansas allocate per-pupil funds directly to the LEA, who 
is then solely responsible for providing all special education services 
directly to charter schools.278  Strict oversight states often have highly 
centralized education systems that protect charter schools from 
incurring high special education costs.  Under the contract model, 
LEAs may contract special education services to the charter schools 
who become de facto agents of the LEA.279  The charter school is free 
to hire special education teachers and provide services, but is also 
directly accountable to the LEA’s director of special education for 
state and federal compliance.280  Finally, in some states, such as 
Colorado, local education agencies employ the insurance model, 
which requires charter schools to pay a flat per-pupil fee to districts in 
order to insure against the possibility of having to educate a high-cost 
student.281  At the end of the school year, the local education agency 
may return unused premiums or hold them in case of future deficits 
for high cost special needs students.282 
In partial-link states, the charter school and LEA negotiate the 
appropriate level of services and funding they will jointly provide.283  
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Such arrangements usually involve a mixture of special education 
services provided by the LEA and the charter school, with the LEA 
disbursing funds, minus administrative fees, to the charter school only 
for services directly provided.284  For example, in Florida, it is 
common for a LEA to assign a liaison between the agency and the 
charter schools within its boundaries; the liaison is responsible for 
coordinating special services and maintaining all IEPs.285  Similarly, in 
Iowa, the charter school and LEA are required to coordinate with the 
Area Education Agency with regards to special education services.286  
Tennessee, in 2012, granted LEAs the authority to withhold 
education funds to cover insurance and other retirement obligations, 
or to withhold up to 1% of educational funds to cover services not 
contracted from the local education agencies.287  The partial-link 
model provides charter schools some insurance from the high costs of 
special needs education: charter schools who are unable to provide 
certain expensive services may negotiate with a LEA, which 
presumably has the infrastructure to take on a portion of those costs.  
However, as discussed earlier, charter schools often lack bargaining 
power in these negotiations, and so may be saddled with a larger 
portion of the expenditures if they cannot provide the services 
directly. 
F. Transportation 
School transportation is one of the most contentious issues for 
school budgets.  Transportation is often a barrier for parents 
attempting to exercise school choice, especially for low-income 
families.288  The transportation costs for charter schools are typically 
higher than for local school districts, because the charter schools 
typically draw students dispersed over a larger area.289  States such as 
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Arizona and Delaware provide state transportation aid to charter 
schools that are not chartered by a local school board.290  California 
law provides that charter schools are entitled to transportation 
services by the local school district at no cost because if the students 
attended a district public school, the district would bear the costs of 
providing transportation anyway.291 Other state enabling statutes do 
not address transportation, leaving charter schools to negotiate with 
local school districts for transportation services. 
IV. PROPOSALS 
The foregoing illustrates the intricate, difficult hurdles charter 
schools face in their plight for equitable funding.  Many states require 
that funds go through an intermediary, often the hosting district, but 
charter schools lack bargaining power against SEAs and LEAs.  In 
order to secure funds, states need to anchor public funds to a stable 
public institution that has access to public debt markets.  Lastly, 
charter schools struggle the most at their beginnings, as they lack 
sufficient start-up funds and adequate facilities.  Charter schools have 
unique financial needs and must rely on public assistance to preserve 
the public character of the charter school movement. 
A number of reforms, most at the state level, are necessary in order 
to close the charter school funding gap.  First, states should 
strengthen charter school bargaining positions by revising their 
charter school laws to provide specific guidance as to mandatory 
funding levels and to remove provisions that hamstring charter 
schools, such as “hold harmless” clauses.  Second, states should 
streamline the funding process and give charter schools greater 
autonomy over their funds by allowing charter schools to organize as 
their own LEA.  Third, expanding the field and role of authorizers 
will spur innovation in charter school models and will ease the 
workload of overburdened state and local education agencies who 
currently act as authorizers.  Fourth, states should fund initiatives that 
provide charter schools access to startup and facilities funding.  Fifth, 
states should rebalance their priorities when it comes to distributing 
funds to charter schools; charter schools should be funded from the 
same local sources as traditional public schools rather than relying on 
state funds.  Finally, charter schools should fight for equal funding on 
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their own behalf by pursuing litigation under their respective state’s 
“adequate education” constitutional provisions. 
A. Drafting Stronger Charter School Laws: Statutory Language, 
Withholding Clauses, and Impact Aid 
As discussed above, charter school statutes are often poorly 
drafted, vague, and give little bargaining power to charter schools 
who must negotiate with public school districts.292  When states use 
words such as “commensurate” or “equitable” to describe funding 
levels with no particular definition, they give hosting school districts 
the ability to define the terms to their advantage.  Moreover, charter 
school statutes often include “hold harmless” clauses, which permit 
hosting school districts to withhold funds that should follow a student 
if that student transfers to a charter school.293  Such provisions 
essentially force taxpayers to fund that student’s education twice — 
once to the school district and again to the charter school.  Further, 
states provide “impact aid” to public schools to cushion the financial 
blow from transferring students.294  This often includes fees that 
charter schools must pay to the district for services normally provided 
on a non-fee basis, such as administrative or transportation 
“reimbursements.”295  These kinds of fee provisions not only cut into 
the already slim funds charter schools rely on to provide education 
programs, but they also give school districts the power to essentially 
determine the financial viability of charter schools. 
There are several amendments that ought to be made to charter 
school statutes in order to level the playing field.  First, charter school 
statutes should specify the funding levels of charter schools and 
provide clear parameters for charter-district negotiations.  For 
example, a statute could expressly dictate that charter schools should 
receive an amount equal to the per-pupil expenditure on students in 
all district public schools.  Further, permissive language such as 
“may” or “ought” should be replaced with mandatory language such 
as “must” or “shall.”  Studies suggest that charter schools in states 
with enabling statutes that use stronger funding language receive an 
average of 4% more funds than charter schools in states with weaker 
language.296  While these amendments may not ensure equal funding 
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to charter schools, specifying an amount will at least allow charter 
schools to plan with a more accurate idea of the public funding they 
will receive.  Specific language will provide charter schools increased 
access to legal recourse if a school district does not give the funding 
specified in the statute. 
Second, state legislatures should consider doing away with “hold 
harmless” and “impact aid” provisions.  School districts argue that 
they have larger fixed costs, such as a collective bargaining agreement 
with a teacher’s union, that prevent them from cutting costs as easily 
as a charter school could.297  But “hold harmless” and “impact aid” 
provisions essentially let the school district shirk its responsibility to 
subsidize the costs of students that attend charter schools, and stall 
necessary systemic reform.  It is widely accepted that the school 
finance structures are moving toward a per-pupil model, which 
require districts to realistically predict the number of children they 
are likely to serve.298  Eliminating a district’s perverse financial 
incentives to fight against this reform would encourage better 
educational outcomes and reduce the burden on taxpayers. 
Third, state legislatures should consider enacting legislation that 
penalizes school districts that withhold funds from charter schools, or 
that exclude them from categorical aid programs intended for all 
public schools within the district.  This can be done in various ways.  
For example, school districts that arbitrarily withhold money from 
charter schools could be assessed a penalty by SEAs.  Alternatively, 
the statute could authorize a punitive damages award for charter 
schools that pursue judicial remedy.  These kinds of penalties would 
give charter schools an advantage both in negotiating service 
contracts with school districts and when enforcing the terms of these 
contracts. 
Finally, improving charter school access to non-profit credit and 
public debt markets would start to even the playing field between 
charter schools and traditional public-school districts.  States can 
provide legislative incentives, such as tax credits similar to those in 
the NMTC, to lenders who invest capital in charter schools in certain 
demographic areas.299  This incentive would lead to more private 
funds being used to construct and maintain new charter schools 
without getting the school district involved.  Similarly, states can act 
to improve charter schools’ ability to raise funds at interest rates 
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similar to those of public-school district tax-exempt bonds.  This 
would allow charter schools to more effectively compete with 
traditional public-school districts.  State legislatures could achieve this 
goal in a number of ways, including enacting state-level credit 
enhancement programs, whereby a charter school that meets certain 
performance targets receives the state’s credit rating (either through a 
guaranty or a subsidy) for purposes of obtaining capital financing. 
Drafting stronger charter school laws that more clearly define 
charter school funding levels and eliminate LEAs’ incentives or 
excuses to withhold funds from charter schools would greatly reduce 
the funding gap, by giving charter schools more negotiating power 
and the ability to pursue legal remedies against non-compliant local 
school boards. 
B. Improving Funds Flow: Local Education Agency Status 
In order to equalize state and federal funding between charter 
schools and public schools, state legislatures increasingly allow 
charter schools or authorizers to organize as their own LEAs, rather 
than organizing the charter school under the hosting school district.  
A LEA receives federal funds directly from the state and is 
responsible for administering these funds to schools.300  The local 
education agency is responsible for overseeing all activities funded by 
federal dollars, to assure delivery of applicable services and inclusion 
of qualified students, to provide training in compliance with federal 
law, and to communicate with state and federal education units.301  
LEA status is controlled by state law, twenty-five states currently 
allow charter schools or their authorizers to organize as LEAs.302 
When a charter school gains LEA status, it can effectively cut out 
the intermediary when receiving federal dollars that are properly 
allocated to it.  There are several benefits to this, both for the charter 
school and the federal government.  The charter school does not have 
to negotiate with the hosting school district for federal money 
properly allocated to it.  Further, charter schools that have LEA 
status are generally more autonomous and receive more money than 
charter schools in states where they cannot organize as a LEA.  For 
the federal government, charter schools with LEA status have more 
flexibility in administering federal funds, which allows them to 
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innovate and improve delivery of services to at-risk youth under Title 
I or special needs students under IDEA. 
States have adopted several different models to grant LEA status 
to charter schools.  Some states allow charter schools to become full-
fledged LEAs, which means they also assume all responsibility for 
complying with federal guidelines.303  These states also parcel out 
state dollars according to LEA status, thus improving access to state 
programs.  Other states allow more flexibility for charter schools to 
negotiate with host school district LEAs for some partial support, 
diverting some of the administrative burdens to the district.304  New 
York grants limited local education agency status to charter schools, 
which allows them to apply only for federal funds.305  Regardless of 
the model, when charter schools can gain LEA status they can 
compete with the hosting district and recoup the funds that would 
have been withheld to cover administrative costs. 
With LEA status, however, comes the burdens of reporting to state 
and federal education units.306  Education reporting requirements are 
notoriously difficult to manage and often require a specialist to 
organize the data and deadlines for a particular school.  Single charter 
schools are at a significant disadvantage because they often lack the 
expertise to comply with reporting requirements on their own, but do 
not have the budget to hire a specialist.  Additionally, single charter 
schools do not enjoy the economy of scale of a large school district 
that oversees dozens of schools.  Even if a charter school hires a 
specialist, the money would likely come out of operational funding at 
the expense of education programming. 
That said, by becoming their own LEAs charter schools can 
eliminate the inefficient education bureaucracies attached to large 
school districts and create more efficient ways for single schools to 
manage reporting requirements.  Charter schools might also find that 
contracting with a private company that manages the reporting 
requirements for several charter schools is more cost-efficient than 
having contracted with the host school district to do so.  This supports 
the education reform goals of charter schools, because bureaucracies 
often stifle innovation and create more overhead, which inevitably 
has a detrimental impact on student achievement. 
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Another problem with charter schools acting as LEAs is that they 
balkanize the education finance landscape, creating autonomous 
agencies within larger school districts.  Increasing the number of 
LEAs in the state necessarily increases the administrative burden on 
SEAs to monitor them for compliance.  While an audit of a single 
school LEA takes less time than auditing a large school district, the 
initial audit by an intermediary (a school district) would be missing.  
In some states, authorizers perform this intermediary audit, but these 
powers are often relatively weak compared to a state regulatory 
authority. 
The concept of charter schools as LEAs is an easy fix for improving 
the flow of federal funds, but it does not work for all state charter 
school schemes.  Many states, such as Massachusetts, allow only the 
SEA to charter a new school.307  In those states, the advantages of 
allowing the charter school to organize as a LEA would be nil, 
because the school already receives its federal and state funds directly 
from the state.  In addition, several states allow only local school 
districts to charter new schools.308  LEA status for charter schools in 
these states would have benefits, but the local school district would 
never allow it, as it has a vested interest in collecting administrative 
fees.  Charter school LEAs would work best in states that allow for 
different kinds of non-district authorizers, because this would give the 
charter school financial and programmatic control in federal 
programs while preserving some level of oversight to the authorizer.  
This reform, of encouraging multiple and alternative authorizers, is 
discussed below. 
C. Strengthening the Role of Authorizers 
As the intermediary between state education agencies and charter 
schools, authorizers are in a unique and pivotal position.  As 
previously discussed, SEAs and local education boards often make 
poor authorizers: state agencies are generally overburdened and local 
education boards have a vested interest in withholding funds from 
charter schools.309  Allowing more diversity in the kinds of 
authorizers would promote a competitive market for authorizers, and 
generate more efficient and innovative methods of evaluating charter 
school progress.310  Moreover, alternative authorizers may act as de-
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facto school boards for charter schools, and state legislatures could 
empower authorizers to administer categorical grants and state aid 
directly to charter schools.  As the entities responsible for monitoring 
charter school progress, authorizers are in the best position to 
determine whether the money that charter school received has been 
effectively spent.  In essence, the authorizer would act as the LEA for 
the charter schools it oversees. 
There are several other advantages to having a more diverse 
authorizer pool.  First, like charter school LEAs, an alternative 
authorizer would prohibit the local school district from arbitrarily 
withholding funds, thereby improving the flow of funds to charter 
schools.  Second, authorizers have the distinct advantage of being 
able to create a more efficient system to manage federal and state 
compliance because they already serve in a monitoring role for a host 
of charter schools but are not themselves responsible for reaching 
educational outcomes.  Third, authorizers typically have greater 
access to institutional resources to assist charter schools in meeting 
educational, financial, and managerial targets. 
Most states, in lieu of allowing alternative authorizers, allow local 
school boards to retain control over the funds but require that the 
authorizer monitor the charter school’s progress.  This separation of 
control not only exacerbates the funding inequities between charter 
schools and public schools, it does not allow the authorizer to 
adequately gauge the effectiveness of a particular charter school 
model because the school itself is underfunded.  A better solution 
would be to allow the authorizer to control both the monitoring and 
financial aspects of the charter school as a disinterested third party. 
Elevating the role of authorizers to monitor funds may have some 
unintended consequences.  Rather than creating innovative financing 
and accountability measures, the authorizers may simply fall back on 
traditional methods used by public school districts, which will only 
maintain the status quo.  Furthermore, many authorizers, such as 
private universities and non-profit organizations, lack public 
accountability.  While it is true that charter schools themselves remain 
accountable to the parents, who can remove their children from the 
school, there will be ineffective oversight of authorizers as a group if 
the state fails to regulate authorizer activity.  Despite these 
challenges, granting authorizers the power to become, in effect, a 
LEA would likely improve funding equity and allow charter schools 
to thrive. 
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D. Categorical Grants: Start-Up and Facilities Funds 
Studies examining barriers to emerging charter schools repeatedly 
find that one of the main hurdles preventing new charter schools from 
forming is lack of start-up and facilities funds.311  These are unique 
funding challenges for charter schools that public schools typically do 
not have to worry about.  Even assuming that charter schools receive 
equal funding, those funds are intended to maintain an educational 
program, not start a new one or pay for rent and facilities 
maintenance.  As discussed above, many charter school organizations 
are sponsored by for-profit or non-profit entities that provide seed 
money to start the school and find a suitable building.312  
Additionally, authorizers typically compete for these programs in 
order to open charter schools in their districts because of their 
reputation for success.313  The charter schools that are left out are 
smaller, community-based schools that often have the most 
innovative models for reaching at-risk students.  These localized 
charter schools rely heavily on private donors or corporations for 
funds.314  As discussed, there are a variety of methods that states can 
adopt to provide start-up funds and facilities access.  What is essential 
is that state legislatures allocate state tax revenue to these initiatives 
rather than leave them underfunded. 
E. Allow Local School Tax Revenues to Flow to Charter Schools 
The majority of public-school funding comes from local property 
and sales taxes, yet the majority of charter school funding comes from 
state aid.315  This likely reflects a political balance within particular 
states — state legislatures favor charter schools and local school 
communities (and school districts) resist them.  Yet, in order for 
charter schools to fairly compete with public schools, they need to 
have access to the same amount of funding, regardless of the source. 
 
 311. See supra Section III.B.2. 
 312. See supra Section II.B. 
 313. See supra Part III. 
 314. See supra Section II.B. 
 315. See supra Section III.A. 
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F. Litigate Under State Charter School Authorization Laws and 
State Constitutions 
Since 2007, there has been a movement of charter schools seeking 
equal funding through the court system.316  Beginning with 
Maryland317 and seen recently in North Carolina318 and Texas,319 
some charter schools sue their authorizers and LEAs to receive the 
same funding as traditional public schools.  These suits rely on 
language in state constitutions providing for “adequate” education, or 
on statutory language that expressly or impliedly requires 
commensurate or proportional funding between traditional public 
schools and charter schools.320  These lawsuits have had mixed 
success, with charter schools in Maryland and North Carolina 
prevailing321 and charter schools in New Jersey and Texas failing in 
their endeavors.322 
Interestingly, the Texas Supreme Court rejected a challenge 
brought by a charter school under the “adequacy” clause of the Texas 
state constitution because, in the court’s view, the Texas constitution 
did not require “adequate” funding to achieve the “general diffusion 
of knowledge.”323  The court reasoned that educational spending does 
not necessarily determine the adequacy of an education, so judicial 
mandates that the legislature allocate specific amounts of money are 
inappropriate.324  This proposition, however, is known to be untrue — 
funding for education, especially when related to facilities and special 
services, is critical to providing an adequate education. 
As states revisit their charter school laws and debates around the 
merits of the school choice movements continue, public policy 
discussions surrounding equal funding for charter schools and 
 
 316. See Jeanette M. Curtis, Note, A Fighting Chance: Inequities in Charter School 
Funding and Strategies for Achieving Equal Access to Public School Funds, 55 HOW. 
L.J. 1057, 1076 (2012). 
 317. See Balt. City Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs v. City Neighbors Charter Sch., 929 A.2d 
113, 131–32 (Md. 2007). 
 318. See Sugar Creek Charter Sch., Inc. v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 
673 S.E.2d 667, 669 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009). 
 319. See Morath v. Tex. Taxpayer & Student Fairness Coal., 490 S.W.3d 826 (Tex. 
2016). 
 320. See City Neighbors, 929 A.2d at 131; Sugar Creek, 673 S.E.2d at 669; Morath, 
490 S.W.3d at 850. 
 321. See City Neighbors, 929 A.2d at 131–32; see generally Sugar Creek, 673 S.E.2d 
667. 
 322. See generally J.D. ex rel. Scipio-Derrick v. Davy, 2 A.3d 387, 393 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2010); Morath, 490 S.W.3d at 850–51. 
 323. See Morath, 490 S.W.3d at 849–50; see also TEX. CONST. art. 7, § 1. 
 324. Morath, 490 S.W.3d at 850–51. 
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traditional public schools, along with equal funding litigation, will 
surely continue.  Adopting the proposals above will give charter 
schools a better bargaining position vis-à-vis traditional public schools 
when negotiating for their share of federal, state, and local funding, 
and will improve the flow of funds from these sources to charter 
schools.  Additionally, these proposals will, if adopted, broadly 
change the education finance landscape, as charter schools would be 
funded at levels similar to traditional public schools.  This increased 
funding will allow charter schools to effectively compete with — and 
continue to innovate — the educational sphere, which can translate 
into better outcomes for students, families, and even school districts. 
CONCLUSION 
The charter school movement represents a new hope for equal 
opportunity to receive a quality education.  Charter schools 
themselves are places of instructional and managerial innovation, and 
the process of creating a charter school, with its layers of oversight 
between authorizers, state education agencies, and local school 
districts, is a mold-breaking reform in governance.  But the charter 
school movement is relatively young, especially when compared with 
the traditional public-school model.  States, school districts, and 
charter schools are only now discovering how to structure rules, 
regulations, and controls in order to make the charter school formula 
successful. 
Advocates from all ends of the political spectrum seem to agree 
with this basic proposition: charter schools should receive the same 
funding as traditional public schools.  This premise is grounded in the 
original ethos that inspired the charter school movement — that 
small, independent schools could do more with the money they 
receive from the government because they would not be hindered by 
the bureaucratic red-tape that prevents traditional public schools 
from pursuing innovative ideas.  Providing equal funding to charter 
schools will place them on even footing with traditional public 
schools, which will give parents more choices in what school is best 
for their child.  This, in theory, will force the public education 
bureaucracy to change.  However, as this Article describes, charter 
schools are woefully and purposefully underfunded, inhibiting the 
market from truly reforming public education. 
Furthermore, denying charter schools equal funding inhibits public 
schools and charter schools from advocating together for greater 
investment in America’s schools and communities.  Rather than 
taking money away from traditional public schools, charter schools 
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actually increase overall investment in education by tapping into 
outside sources of funding to supplement public education.  
Equalizing funding will enhance overall investment of both private 
and public dollars in education, which will allow charter schools and 
public-school districts to come together to advocate for greater 
government investment in schools.  The broad solution to this 
problem is to reform state charter school laws so they provide equal 
funding for charter schools.  Practically, this solution will play out 
differently in each state, as laws must be tailored to the state and local 
context in which the charter school will function. 
Money alone will not raise achievement in public or charter 
schools.  More than anything else, public and charter schools need 
dedicated, quality educators and school leaders to teach, inspire, and 
motivate students to reach their potential.  But research has shown 
that every student is different.  Thus, in order to promote students’ 
growth into the citizens of tomorrow, innovative and different 
educational environments need to be created.  Funding plays a critical 
role in creating these innovative contexts in charter schools. 
